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 Florida has substantially regulated the relationship between mo-
tor vehicle manufacturers and motor vehicle dealers since 1970. 
Through the years, the legislature has made a number of substantive 
amendments to Florida’s core motor vehicles statutes contained in 
chapter 320, Florida Statutes, including changes in 1980, 1984, and a 
major overhaul in 1988. The 2001 legislature has again passed major 
amendments to the regulatory scheme. This Article is intended as an 
analytical review of these amendments. 
 Chapter 320’s regulatory scheme pertains to a very specific indus-
try with narrowly defined interests. It is precisely these narrowly de-
fined interests, however, that allow an analysis of the 2001 statutory 
changes to serve as an excellent example of the legislative response— 
formulated principally by private interests—to developments in case 
law and business practices. Moreover, although the workings of the 
regulatory scheme take place “off the radar,” the business it regu-
lates is of great importance to the public at large, with about seven-
teen million new cars and light trucks sold each year in the United 
States by over 20,000 dealers. 
I.   FLORIDA’S REGULATION OF MOTOR VEHICLES, DEALERS, 
AND MANUFACTURERS 
A.   Title and Registration 
 As anyone who owns a car knows, a motor vehicle is personal 
property, the ownership of which is evidenced by a title. The regula-
tion of motor vehicle titling is found principally in chapter 319, Flor-
ida Statutes, which establishes the authority for titling vehicles. 
Ownership of new vehicles held in inventory for sale to first-time 
buyers is evidenced by a manufacturer’s statement of origin, which is 
converted to a certificate of title when a consumer purchases the ve-
hicle. Once issued, a title can be transferred from owner to owner on 
resale.1 This titling system not only provides the means of tracing 
ownership, it also protects the consumer by requiring disclosures 
about the vehicle’s history2 and odometer statements.3 Furthermore, 
it protects creditors by requiring certificates of title, which provide a 
notice of lien.4 
B.   Motor Vehicle Registration and Motor Vehicle Dealer Licensing 
 In addition to having a title, each motor vehicle used on the public 
roads must be registered. The basic statutory framework for registra-
                                                                                                                    
 1. FLA. STAT. §§ 319.21-.22 (2001). 
 2. Id. § 319.14 (e.g., previous use as a police car or taxicab). 
 3. Id. § 319.225; cf. 49 C.F.R. § 580.5 (2000). 
 4. FLA. STAT. § 319.27. 
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tion is found in various sections of chapter 320.5 For example, 
chapter 320 allows for voluntary contributions to organizations at the 
time of registration,6 authorizes the license tax7 and specialty license 
plates,8 and provides the various procedures for accomplishing regis-
tration. 
 Chapter 320 also mandates the licensing of motor vehicle dealers 
in several classes. Classification depends on whether the dealer has a 
contract to represent a manufacturer in the sale of new motor vehi-
cles, sells only used vehicles, or deals only in wholesale, in vehicles at 
auction, or in salvaged vehicles.9 This licensing system provides the 
additional protection of state oversight from the Department of High-
way Safety and Motor Vehicles (“Department”) of the sale and, to a 
limited extent, the servicing of motor vehicles. The Department is 
empowered to deny applications or to suspend and revoke dealer 
licenses for a number of violations related to business practices or 
criminal history.10 The clear intent of the regulation is to create pro-
tection for consumers against unscrupulous dealers. In this same 
vein, the statutes require dealers to post a small surety bond of 
$25,000 against losses that may be caused by a dealer’s regulatory 
violations.11 The statute also directs the Department to enforce its 
authority by imposing civil fines12 and by seeking injunctions in cir-
cuit court.13 
C.   Licensing of Manufacturers and Regulation 
of the Manufacturer-Dealer Relationship 
 This Article addresses sections 320.60-.70, Florida Statutes. In 
these sections, the legislature requires that each manufacturer, fac-
tory branch, distributor, or importer (collectively referred to in the 
statutory scheme as “licensee” and generally referred to in this 
Article as “manufacturer”) be licensed.14 An application for license 
may be denied, or a license may be revoked or suspended, on various 
                                                                                                                    
 5. Id. § 320.02. 
 6. Id. § 320.023. 
 7. Id. § 320.08. 
 8. Id. §§ 320.08056, .08058, .0807. 
 9. Id. § 320.27. The delimiting definition of motor vehicle, see id. § 320.27(1)(b), and 
the related definition of motor vehicle dealer, see id. § 320.27(1)(c), does not include mobile 
homes, recreational vehicles, mopeds, or motorcycles with a displacement of 50 cc or less. 
Mobile home dealers are licensed pursuant to section 320.77, and recreational vehicle 
dealers are licensed pursuant to section 320.771. Mopeds and small displacement motorcy-
cles may be sold without a dealer’s license. 
 10. Id. § 320.27(9). 
 11. Id. § 320.27(10). 
 12. Id. § 320.27(12). 
 13. Id. § 320.27(11). 
 14. Id. § 320.61. 
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grounds.15 Whereas denial, suspension, or revocation of dealer li-
censes are based on consumer protection, the grounds for acting 
against licensees arise principally out of their dealings with motor 
vehicle dealers with whom the licensees have a contractual relation-
ship allowing the dealer to sell and service the licensee’s new motor 
vehicles.16 In addition, separate sections regulate specific aspects of 
the manufacturer-dealer relationship in the following areas: cancel-
lations or modifications of franchise agreements;17 establishment of 
additional dealers;18 sale of interests in dealerships;19 change in ex-
ecutive management of dealerships;20 restrictions on licensees as 
dealers;21 and payment of warranty reimbursements to dealers.22 
 In the past, sections 320.60-.70 have been amended occasionally to 
address issues arising out of frictions between dealers and manufac-
turers or in reaction to decisional law. Occasionally, the issues have 
reached sufficient volume to produce a major revision, as happened 
in 1988.23 The legislative amendments in 2001 are the result of a 
build-up of commercial pressure and court decisions. 
II.   THE MANUFACTURER-DEALER RELATIONSHIP 
A.   The Beginnings of the Regulatory System 
 The manufacturer-dealer relationship has grown out of the his-
tory of twentieth century sales and marketing of motor vehicles. One 
must be very indifferent to the economic and social history of the 
United States to be unaware of the role played by the car in Ameri-
can life. Those who use “Frigidaire” instead of “refrigerator” to refer 
to the common household appliance might still use “agency” to refer 
to a car “dealership.” “Agency” suggests the early method of selling 
motor cars, in which the vehicle was ordered from the manufacturer, 
delivered to the agency, and in turn delivered to the buyer by the 
agent, who perhaps gave the buyer his first and only driving lesson 
at delivery. 
 By the 1920s, manufacturers had firmly established the inde-
pendent dealer system, in which the manufacturer and dealer en-
tered into a contract establishing the rights and obligations of the re-
                                                                                                                    
 15. Id. § 320.64. 
 16. See id. § 320.60(l) (defining “agreement” or “franchise agreement”). 
 17. Id. § 320.641. 
 18. Id. § 320.642. 
 19. Id. § 320.643. 
 20. Id. § 320.644. 
 21. Id. § 320.645. 
 22. Id. § 320.696. 
 23. Mary E. Haskins & Walter E. Forehand, Regulations for Motor Vehicle Manufac-
turers and New Protections for Their Franchisees, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 763 (1988) (dis-
cussing the comprehensive revisions enacted by the 1988 legislature). 
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lationship.24 The manufacturer’s bargaining position in these con-
tracts was clearly greater than that of the dealer. The economic ebb 
and flow and the natural competition created by the existence of 
competing manufacturers—to whom dealers could go if their manu-
facturer abused its power too greatly—kept the system somewhat in 
balance through the first half of the century. However, the inequities 
arising from the inequality of power became generally recognized as 
a threat to the efficient provision of vehicles to consumers.25 Pushed 
along by public opinion and the National Automobile Dealers Asso-
ciation, regulation began to emerge. The most prominent early ex-
ample of this regulation was the Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court 
Act (“ADDICA”).26 
B.   The Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act 
 Congress passed ADDICA in 1956.27 A congressional report pre-
sented the question this way: 
Automobile production is one of the most highly concentrated in-
dustries in the United States, a matter of grave concern to officers 
of the Government charged with enforcement of the antitrust laws. 
Today there exist only 5 passenger-car manufacturers, 3 of which 
produce in excess of 95 percent of all passenger cars sold in the 
United States. There are approximately 40,000 franchised auto-
mobile dealers distributing to the public cars produced by these 
manufacturers. Dealers have an average investment of about 
$100,000. This vast disparity in economic power and bargaining 
strength has enabled the factory to determine arbitrarily the rules 
by which the two parties conduct their business affairs. These 
rules are incorporated in the sales agreement or franchise which 
the manufacturer has prepared for the dealer’s signature. 
 Dealers are with few exceptions completely dependent on the 
manufacturer for their supply of cars. When the dealer has in-
vested to the extent required to secure a franchise, he becomes in a 
real sense the economic captive of his manufacturer. The substan-
tial investment of his own personal funds by the dealer in the 
business, the inability to convert easily the facilities to other uses, 
the dependence upon a single manufacturer for supply of automo-
biles, and the difficulty of obtaining a franchise from another 
manufacturer all contribute toward making the dealer an easy 
prey for domination by the factory. On the other hand, from the 
standpoint of the automobile manufacturer, any single dealer is 
                                                                                                                    
 24. STEWART MACAULAY, LAW AND THE BALANCE OF POWER: THE AUTOMOBILE 
MANUFACTURERS AND THEIR DEALERS 13-15 (1966). 
 25. See id. at 10-12. 
 26. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (2000). 
 27. Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act, ch. 1038, 70 Stat. 1125 (1956) (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1221-25 (2000)). 
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expendable. The faults of the factory-dealer system are directly at-
tributable to the superior market position of the manufacturer.28 
Congress’s reaction was short and to the point: 
An automobile dealer may bring suit against any automobile 
manufacturer engaged in commerce, in any district court of the 
United States in the district in which said manufacturer resides, 
or is found, or has an agent, without respect to the amount in con-
troversy, and shall recover the damages by him sustained and the 
cost of suit by reason of the failure of said automobile manufac-
turer from and after August 8, 1956, to act in good faith in per-
forming or complying with any of the terms or provisions of the 
franchise, or in terminating, canceling, or not renewing the fran-
chise with said dealer: Provided, That in any such suit the manu-
facturer shall not be barred from asserting in defense of any such 
action the failure of the dealer to act in good faith.29 
On the surface, the statute would appear to require that manufac-
turers play fairly with their dealers, specifically when carrying out 
the franchise agreement and when terminating, canceling, or not re-
newing the agreement. The definitions, however, make clear that 
“good faith” is not an ethical term. 
 Indeed, the definition of good faith has been the key question in 
judicial interpretations and applications of the statute: 
The term “good faith” shall mean the duty of each party to any 
franchise, and all officers, employees, or agents thereof to act in a 
fair and equitable manner toward each other so as to guarantee 
the one party freedom from coercion, intimidation, or threats of co-
ercion or intimidation from the other party: Provided, That rec-
ommendation, endorsement, exposition, persuasion, urging or ar-
gument shall not be deemed to constitute a lack of good faith.30 
This definition is the key to the evil against which Congress sought 
to intercede. Because of their superior positions, the manufacturers 
could (and did) intimidate dealers and coerce them to tolerate busi-
ness arrangements which they would prefer not to accept. As dealers 
rightly feared that their term contracts would be terminated or sim-
ply would not be renewed at the end of their terms, this was the ul-
timate threat to a dealership’s survival. 
 The “coercive” component of the definition, and the proviso ex-
pressly allowing manufacturers to aggressively press their contrac-
tual positions, has led to a body of case law in the district and circuit 
courts31 that requires an “illegal” threat by a manufacturer or its rep-
                                                                                                                    
 28. S. REP. NO. 84-2073, at 2 (1956). 
 29. Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act § 1222 (2000). 
 30. Id. § 1221(e). 
 31. The Supreme Court has never interpreted the statute.  
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resentative in order to support an action under the statute.32 Conse-
quently, as long as employees are trained to avoid outright threats, a 
manufacturer can shield itself from liability under the statute. 
 This Article is not intended to go deeply into the workings of 
ADDICA. For these purposes, it is sufficient to note that ADDICA is 
a forerunner of the state dealer franchise laws, of which chapter 320, 
Florida Statutes, is an example. ADDICA provides one example of 
legislative reaction to a perceived problem in the industry. Congress 
was careful to provide that states are free to legislate in this area as 
long as state statutes are not in direct conflict.33 
C.   State Regulatory Statutes 
 Both before and after the passage of ADDICA, states have been 
concerned with regulation of dealers and manufacturers of motor ve-
hicles. The United States Supreme Court, for example, recited a brief 
history of California’s efforts in New Motor Vehicle Board of Califor-
nia v. Orrin W. Fox Co.,34 the only case in which the Court has dis-
cussed these state statutes. These regulations began first as licens-
ing or certification statutes addressed at dealers and later manufac-
turers. Later, California and other states added sections dealing with 
specific topics. As the Court noted in Orrin W. Fox Co., the Supreme 
Court of Wisconsin, in discussing the application of a prohibition in 
Wisconsin’s law against manufacturers applying for dealer licenses, 
noted that the Wisconsin statutes “[were] enacted in recognition of 
the long history of the abuse of dealers by manufacturers.”35 The 
Wisconsin court also provided a thumbnail sketch of the Wisconsin 
statute’s history: 
Sec. 218.01(3), Stats., is a part of the Wisconsin Auto Dealership 
Law, which was enacted in 1935. Implicit in this law is the recog-
nition of the gross disparity of bargaining power between the 
manufacturer of automobiles and the local retailer. It was enacted 
in recognition of the long history of abuse of dealers by manufac-
turers. These laws deal with the relationship between auto manu-
facturers and auto dealers. The purpose of the law is to furnish the 
dealer with some protection against unfair treatment by the manu-
facturer. Sec. 218.01(3)(f) was enacted into law in 1955. Earlier 
enactments had guarded against specific evils occasioned by what 
the legislature considered the unfair or overreaching tactics of 
manufacturers, e.g., forced acceptance of unordered autos or parts; 
                                                                                                                    
 32. See, e.g., Autohaus Brugger, Inc. v. Saab Motors, Inc., 567 F.2d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 
1978) (requiring unfair and inequitable actual or threatened coercion or intimidation to 
violate the statutory duty of good faith). 
 33. Automobile Dealers’ Day in Court Act § 1225. 
 34. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).  
 35. Forest Home Dodge, Inc. v. Karns, 138 N.W.2d 214, 217-18 (Wis. 1965). 
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coercion or unfair treatment through threat of cancellation; unfair 
cancellation or refusal to renew franchises, or without due regard 
to the equities of the dealer.36 
Not every state, however, began its regulation as early, especially 
regulation of the manufacturer-dealer relationship. The 1970s were a 
particularly rich time for this type of regulation, although some 
states did not begin to regulate in this area until the early 1980s. To-
day every state has some form of regulation, and the states regularly 
amend their statutes. 
D.   The Florida Automobile Dealers Act: Sections 320.60-.70, 
Florida Statutes37 
 Florida began to require motor vehicle dealers to be licensed in 
1923.38 Licensing of manufacturers began in 1941.39 The first version 
of the regulatory scheme currently found in sections 320.60-.70 was 
enacted in 1970.40 A major addition in 1980 first regulated the trans-
fer of interests in dealerships,41 and changes in management were 
regulated in 1984.42 The first major overhaul of the statute occurred 
in 1988, in connection with the now repealed “sunset” reviews.43 Each 
of these steps was a reaction to a perceived need for the regulation of 
the relationship. In 1988, the legislature at last stated the overall 
purpose of the regulation: 
It is the intent of the Legislature to protect the public health, 
safety and welfare of the citizens of the state by regulating the li-
censing of motor vehicle dealers and manufacturers, maintaining 
competition, providing consumer protection and fair trade and 
providing minorities with opportunities for full participation as 
motor vehicle dealers.44 
 Unlike regulations applying to motor vehicle dealers45—which are 
primarily aimed at protecting consumers from abuses by dealers—
the regulations in the Act are designed primarily to protect dealers. 
                                                                                                                    
 36. Id. (citations omitted). 
 37. No section of the statute provides a short title; however, some courts have referred 
to the provisions as such. See Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., 
Inc., 32 F.3d 528, 529 (11th Cir. 1994). But see Meteor Motors, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor Am. 
Corp., No. 97-8820-Civ., 1999 WL 1800074, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 1999) (using the “Flor-
ida Motor Vehicle Dealer Protection Act”) (emphasis added). The legislation will be referred 
to hereinafter as the “Act.” 
 38. Act effective June 7, 1923, ch. 9157, 1923 Fla. Laws 156. 
 39. Act effective Oct. 1, 1941, ch. 20236, 1941 Fla. Laws 103. 
 40. Act effective Jan. 1, 1971, ch. 70-424, 1970 Fla. Laws 1269. 
 41. FLA. STAT. § 320.643 (1981) (amended 1995, 2001). 
 42. Id. § 320.644 (1985) (amended 1988). 
 43. Act effective Oct. 1, 1988, ch. 88-395, 1988 Fla. Laws 2290. 
 44. Id. at 2297 (creating FLA. STAT. § 320.605). 
 45. FLA. STAT. § 320.27 (2001). 
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Without going into great detail, a survey of the provisions in sections 
320.60-.70 will provide useful orientation to the regulatory scheme. 
 Definitions of “motor vehicle related” terms generally applicable to 
Florida Statutes are found in section 320.01. Definitions specially 
used in the Act are set forth in section 320.60. Because some of these 
terms are used in a more specialized manner in sections 320.60-.70, 
the definitions section takes on substantive significance. 
 One should note that “licensee,” used often in these sections, is de-
fined as “any person licensed or required to be licensed under section 
320.61.”46 In this Article, the term manufacturer is frequently used 
interchangeably with “licensee,” technically including manufacturer, 
factory branch, distributor, or importer47—terms used for the pro-
vider of vehicles to dealers, whether or not the providing entity is in 
fact the entity which manufactures the vehicles. 
 Sections 320.61, .615, .62, .63, and .64 cover the licensing process, 
establishing who must be licensed, the agent for service of process, li-
censing fees, the application process, and grounds for denial, suspen-
sion, or revocation of licenses. Section 320.64 provides a long list of 
prohibited actions, the commission of which may provide grounds for 
the Department to act against the licensee. The section also provides 
for causes of action by dealers.  
 Sections 320.6403 and .6405 provide that manufacturers or im-
porters may not refuse successors to their distributors.  Subsidiaries 
of licensees are deemed to be agents of the licensee—that is, 
manufacturers may not avoid legal obligations by attempting to func-
tion through other entities. 
 Sections 320.641, .642, .643, and .644 each regulates an aspect of 
manufacturer-dealer relations, superseding the contractual agree-
ment between the parties.48 Section 320.641 establishes procedures 
and requirements that a manufacturer must follow to terminate a 
dealer, cancel or decide not to renew a franchise, or modify a fran-
chise. Section 320.642 requires a manufacturer to give notice and an 
opportunity to be heard to affected dealers when it wishes to add an 
additional dealer in an area or relocate an existing dealer. Also, upon 
protest by one of its dealers, the manufacturer must prove that exist-
ing dealer representation is inadequate. Section 320.643 establishes 
procedures for the transfer of ownership interests in dealerships. Fi-
nally, section 320.644 addresses the procedure under which dealers 
may change executive management. 
                                                                                                                    
 46. Id. § 320.60(8). 
 47. See id. § 320.61(1). 
 48. See Bayview Buick-GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 597 So. 2d 887, 889 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1992). 
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 Section 320.645 limits the right of a manufacturer to have an 
ownership interest in a dealership. Sections 320.664, .67, .68, and .69 
deal with departmental procedural matters. Section 320.696 estab-
lishes requirements for manufacturers to reimburse dealers for doing 
service work covered under manufacturers’ warranties, and sections 
320.6992 and .701 delineate the applicability of the statute. 
 Section 320.698 provides for civil fines to be enforced by the De-
partment for violations of the Act. Section 320.70 establishes a 
criminal violation (first degree misdemeanor) for violations. Section 
320.695 creates an injunction remedy without bond to the Depart-
ment, or to dealers in the name of the Department, to prevent or stop 
violations. Section 320.697 creates a private right of action for any 
person injured by a violation of the statute, including treble damages 
and prevailing plaintiff’s attorney’s fees and costs. Section 320.699 
creates express rights to administrative proceedings for declaratory 
statements and for protests by dealers of proposed additional dealer-
ships. 
III.   THE 2001 CHANGES TO THE ACT: ACTION AND REACTION  
TO MARKET CHANGES AND JUDICIAL INTERPRETATIONS 
 Those amendments to the Act passed by the 2001 legislature and 
signed by the Governor, contained in Committee Substitute for Sen-
ate Bill 1956, represent the compromises that made their way into 
law. For the purposes of this analysis, however, a comparison 
between the new laws and the proposals that were filed and consid-
ered by the 2001 legislature is instructive.  Such a comparison pro-
vides an understanding of the interplay of concerns that motivated 
the efforts to amend this segment of the Act. Of principal interest is 
House Bill 1239—devoted exclusively to amending the Act—which 
contains a virtual wish list of dealer oriented amendments. 
A.   Who Is a Motor Vehicle Dealer Under the Act? 
 Changes in these definitions of who is a motor vehicle dealer have 
a substantive effect on the regulatory provisions of the Act. For ex-
ample, prior to the 2001 amendments, a motor vehicle dealer for the 
purposes of the Act was one who repaired or sold vehicles pursuant 
to a franchise agreement.49 A motor vehicle was and continues to be 
defined as any new automobile, motorcycle, or truck which has not 
had title transferred to an ultimate purchaser.50 Many businesses 
sell small displacement motorcycles, often called motor scooters, of 
50cc or less. These vehicles are motor vehicles as defined by section 
                                                                                                                    
 49. FLA. STAT. § 320.60(11)(a) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 50. Id. § 320.60(10) (2001). 
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320.01(1)(a). The businesses often have a selling agreement with the 
vehicle manufacturer that satisfies the definition of franchise agree-
ment under section 320.60(1). However, under the special definition 
of motor vehicle in section 320.27(1)(b), which indirectly defines mo-
tor vehicle dealer in section 320.27(1)(c), small displacement motor-
cycles are expressly not motor vehicles. Accordingly, those who sell 
them are not required to be licensed as motor vehicle dealers by sec-
tion 320.27(3). Therefore, under the definitions of the Act, a seller 
might be protected under the Act but still not be a motor vehicle 
dealer otherwise regulated by chapter 320. On the other hand, if the 
vehicle in question does not fit the definition of automobile, motorcy-
cle, or truck, then it is not protected by the Act. This is the case re-
gardless of whether the business is required to be licensed as a motor 
vehicle dealer or not.51 
 Given the implications of these definitions, the 2001 amendment 
to section 320.60(11)(a) must be examined in detail. The 2000 statute 
read: 
“Motor vehicle dealer” means any person, firm, or corporation who, 
for commission, money or other things of value, repairs or services 
motor vehicles or used motor vehicles pursuant to an agreement as 
defined in subsection (1), or sells, exchanges, buys, or rents, or of-
fers, or attempts to negotiate a sale or exchange of any interest in, 
motor vehicles or who is engaged wholly or in part in the business 
of selling motor vehicles, whether or not such motor vehicles are 
owned by such person, firm, or corporation.52 
 The 2001 statute now reads: 
“Motor vehicle dealer” means any person, firm, company, corpora-
tion, or other entity, who, 
 1. Is licensed pursuant to s. 320.27 as a “franchised motor ve-
hicle dealer” and, for commission, money or other things of value, 
repairs or services motor vehicles or used motor vehicles pursuant 
to an agreement as defined in subsection (1), or 
 2. Who sells, exchanges, buys, leases or rents, or offers, or at-
tempts to negotiate a sale or exchange of any interest in, motor 
vehicles, or 
                                                                                                                    
 51. See Aero Prod. Corp. v. Dep’t Highway Safety & Motor Vehicles, 675 So. 2d 661, 
663-64 (Fla. 5th DCA 1996). This case creates even greater confusion. The Department, 
supported by the Fifth District Court of Appeal, see id. at 664-65 (Griffin, J., concurring), 
used the definition of “truck” found in section 320.01(9), Florida Statutes, to decide 
whether the vehicle sold was a “motor vehicle,” because section 320.60(10) defines “motor 
vehicle” as a “new automobile, motorcycle, or truck.” One wonders how the Department 
will react in the future if it is presented with the proposition that heavy truck dealers, 
which have consistently been treated as dealers under the protection of the Act, are not 
dealers because “truck,” see FLA. STAT. § 320.01(9), “heavy truck,” id. § 320.01(10), and 
“truck tractor,” id. § 320.01(11), are each defined as a distinct vehicle. 
 52. FLA. STAT. § 320.60(11)(a) (2000) (amended 2001). 
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 3. Who is engaged wholly or in part in the business of selling 
motor vehicles, whether or not such motor vehicles are owned by 
such person, firm, company, or corporation.53 
 The position of dealers as a group is that new motor vehicles may 
only be sold by persons licensed as “franchised motor vehicle 
dealer[s]” pursuant to section 320.27(1)(c)1. While that is the general 
rule, modern business practices create gray areas. Some persons op-
erating as independent dealers54 are able to acquire new vehicles 
from franchised dealers for their inventories, thus avoiding the need 
to pay sales tax because there is no sales tax on property bought for 
inventory. Independent dealers subsequently sell the vehicles for a 
profit but still at a price typically lower than competing franchised 
dealers. The vehicles are titled as used but retain virtually all of the 
advantages of new vehicles to the consumer.55  
 Moreover, the increasing use of e-commerce has created new op-
portunities for consumers to purchase new vehicles from persons out-
side the state. These practices have raised the concern that volume 
sellers from outside the state—or within the state selling off-
premises—may undersell franchised dealers unfairly, because they 
do not have the overhead ordinarily required to be a franchised 
dealer. Because the establishment of additional motor vehicle dealers 
is regulated by section 320.642, the definition of motor vehicle dealer 
can be important for establishing methods of private or public polic-
ing of illegal practices. 
 The new subsection 320.60(11)(a) addresses one aspect of that is-
sue. In Meteor Motors, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor America Corp.,56 the 
court was not impressed by the plaintiff ’ s argument that Hyundai 
had granted a new dealer franchise when it entered into an agree-
ment under which Dollar Rent-a-Car could receive reimbursement 
for doing warranty service on Hyundais in Dollar’s rental fleet. The 
right to perform warranty service is ordinarily exclusive to licensed 
franchised motor vehicle dealers. The court had several grounds for 
granting Hyundai summary judgment, one of which was that Dollar 
was a rental car company and so excluded from the definition of 
dealer.57 However, at least as far as the classification of Dollar as a 
dealer for the purposes of the Act is concerned, the question was 
clearly a tight one. Absent the rental car exception, the court would 
have had to rely on other grounds to grant summary judgment. 
                                                                                                                    
 53. Id. § 320.60(11)(a) (2001). 
 54. Id. § 320.27(1)(c)2. 
 55. Other regulations already in place have sought to limit this practice. See FLA. 
ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 15C-7.005 (1998). 
 56. No. 97-8820-Civ., 1999 WL 1800074 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 9, 1999). 
 57. Id. at *2-3. 
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 By requiring that a motor vehicle dealer be licensed as a “fran-
chised motor vehicle dealer,” under section 320.27, the amended 
statute now makes clear that if the person is not required to be li-
censed, then the person will not be a dealer for purposes of the Act. 
Or does it? A committee analysis of Committee Substitute for Senate 
Bill 1956 asserts: 
The bill amends s. 360.60, F.S., [sic] revising the definition of “mo-
tor vehicle dealer” so that the person or firm must also be licensed 
as a “franchised motor vehicle dealer” pursuant to s. 320.27, F.S., 
in order to be considered a “motor vehicle dealer,” and includes 
persons or firms who lease motor vehicles in the definition.58 
Ordinary principles of construction do not support this conclusion. 
The disjunctives in the 2000 statute might be construed as establish-
ing one category of dealer: doing any of these (selling, servicing, or 
being in the business of selling) pursuant to an agreement makes one 
a motor vehicle dealer.  
 The 2001 statute has created, with very distinct subparts each 
numbered and separated by a disjunctive, pace the House committee 
analysis, three definitions of motor vehicle dealer. A person is a mo-
tor vehicle dealer if he services or repairs vehicles pursuant to a 
franchise agreement and is required to be licensed by section 
320.27(3); if he sells, buys, etc. motor vehicles (there is no require-
ment that there be a franchise agreement or that the person be li-
censed); or if he is in the business of selling, buying, etc., motor vehi-
cles (there is no requirement that there be a franchise agreement or 
that the person be licensed). The Meteor Motors question is clari-
fied—in the service-only context, the person must be licensed under 
section 320.27. However, the presumably careful separation into sub-
parts conclusively supports the interpretation that those who sell ve-
hicles are dealers for the purposes of the Act, regardless of whether 
they are franchisees or are section 320.27 dealers. 
 A curious feature of the amendment to section 320.11(a) is the ad-
dition of the words “company” and “or other entity.” One must ask 
whether anything is meant or gained by the addition. The definition 
of “person”59 adequately covers all natural and juridical persons. Why 
then was “company” added to a sequence already containing super-
fluous terms? Perhaps the answer lies in the increasing use of lim-
ited liability companies (LLCs) as a business organization of choice 
for operating motor vehicle dealerships. Lay persons will not need to 
be nervous that their LLCs are not “corporations.” Even so, it is curi-
ous that “company” should be so favored and “limited partnership,” a 
                                                                                                                    
 58. Fla. H.R. Comm. on Transp., CS for SB 1956 (2001) Staff Analysis 5 (June 15, 
2001) (on file with comm.). 
 59. FLA. STAT. § 320.60(12). 
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business organization not infrequently used to operate dealerships, is 
omitted. Often the truth is that an amendment is made with one ob-
jective in mind without seeing anomalies which it may create. In this 
case both “person” and “other entity” are so inclusive that perhaps 
the drafters should have used only “person.” The lawyer needs only 
“person” and the definition thereof; however, because “company” and 
“corporation” are specifically named, the lay person is left wondering 
whether a limited partnership may be a motor vehicle dealer. 
 Another potential impact of the new definition of motor vehicle 
dealer is in section 320.642, which provides the procedure a manu-
facturer must follow if it wishes to establish an additional dealer in 
an area. One asks whether, under the literal language of the defini-
tion of motor vehicle dealer, one who sells a manufacturer’s new ve-
hicles by e-commerce into an area might be an additional motor vehi-
cle dealer added by the manufacturer. 
B.   Limiting the Manufacturer’s Role as a Dealer 
1.   The Problem 
 Most states have included in their regulations a prohibition 
against “company stores”—that is, dealerships owned by a manufac-
turer. The dealer must rely on the manufacturer for inventory of new 
vehicles and the parts and accessories used to repair and service 
them. Consequently, if certain dealer competitors are owned by the 
manufacturer, the appearance—and perhaps the reality—will be 
that “company stores” will be given unfair competitive advantages. 
For example, a “company store” might sell vehicles at a much lower 
profit than an independent competitor. Indeed, the de facto customer 
of the manufacturer is its dealer. The manufacturer sells its products 
not to the consumer but to the dealer. Of course, if the product is un-
attractive to customers or if the dealer does not sell the product effec-
tively, then there is a powerful effect on the manufacturer. Without 
continued sale to customers, the system would eventually break 
down to the manufacturer’s detriment. Nonetheless, because the 
manufacturer makes its profit from the sale of the product to the 
dealer, a dealer owned by the manufacturer would not need to make 
as much profit as a dealer owned by another. The “company store” 
would need only to sell many vehicles at break even for the manufac-
turer to make an overall corporate profit on the vehicles. 
 Such a system could have devastating effect on existing dealers 
who would be forced to compete in a profit-oriented economy with a 
direct competitor—the “company store”—that has a different agenda. 
But is this sort of competition in the public interest? For the over-
whelming majority of the states, the answer has been no. The dealer 
system has been firmly established: to allow this form of competition 
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is both unfair and potentially adverse to the public. The “private” 
competition between dealers keeps prices in line, and the need to at-
tract customers gives an incentive to provide good customer service—
or so the states perceive. If dealers are forced out of business by com-
petition from “company stores,” consumers will ultimately suffer. 
 In fact, there is anecdotal evidence that “company stores” do not 
do well. Some states—for example, Indiana and Utah—have never 
prohibited manufacturer ownership. In the 1990s, for example, there 
were several unsuccessful experiments by Ford with manufacturer 
controlled dealer groups in Indianapolis and Salt Lake City. 
Nonetheless, dealers remain wary of efforts to establish de facto 
“company stores.” 
 The arrival in recent years of the Internet as an avenue of com-
merce has also concerned dealers. On the one hand, dealers worry 
that the Internet offers manufacturers a way of selling directly to 
customers without bricks and mortar, both as a means of selling ve-
hicles and of marketing “indirect” products that dealers rely on for 
significant profits. These include the sale of retail sales contracts 
made by the dealers with consumers to commercial lenders, who buy 
the contracts and give the dealer a percentage of the interest for plac-
ing the contract with them, and from commissions on the sale of 
credit life insurance and extended service insurance commonly called 
an extended warranty. 
 In addition, manufacturers’ experiments with the Internet have 
led to concerns that the manufacturers may be able to create an un-
even playing field by favoring some dealers over others by referring 
customer leads from Internet contacts to local favorites. In addition, 
some are concerned with the potential upset to the local competitive 
balance in the pricing of products and services that would occur if 
manufacturers supplied suggestions over the Internet to consumers 
concerning retail pricing in the consumers’ area; for example, manu-
facturers could provide quotes for average selling prices of specific 
models. 
2.   Florida’s New Prohibition Against Manufacturer Ownership 
 Since 1984, Florida has generally prohibited manufacturer owner-
ship of dealerships.60 The 2000 version of section 320.645 prohibited 
ownership directly or indirectly by a licensee, agent, or subsidiary 
except under limited circumstances. A manufacturer was permitted 
to own a dealership, for example, under the following circumstances:  
(a) operation lasted for no more than one year during a change in 
ownership; (b) while a dealership was for sale to an independent per-
                                                                                                                    
 60. Id. § 320.645 (2000) (amended 2001). 
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son at a fair price (unless after a chapter 120 hearing the manufac-
turer could show that no person was available to buy the dealership); 
or (c) in “a bona fide relationship with an independent person, other 
than a licensee or its agent or affiliate, who has made a significant 
investment that is subject to loss in the dealership and who can rea-
sonably expect to acquire full ownership of the dealership on reason-
able terms and conditions.”61 
 The “one year” and “no available person” provisions of the statute 
have not been an issue. However, the “bona fide relationship” provi-
sion has recently caused controversy. The provision is meant to allow 
manufacturers to implement programs in which some division of the 
manufacturer acts as a co-owner of a dealership with an individual, 
often a minority person, who has a contractual right to gradually buy 
out the manufacturer co-owner. 
 In these arrangements, the manufacturer provides a substantial 
share of the initial capital necessary to establish the dealership. The 
individual makes sufficient investment to have a small initial equity 
ownership and operates the dealership under a contract that allows 
him to purchase shares from the manufacturer on a regular basis, 
requiring the dealership to be generally profitable at the risk of the 
individual forfeiting ownership entirely. While manufacturers are 
ordinarily content to have their retail networks provided by the capi-
tal of independent dealers, the recent experiments with various 
forms of retailing through dealerships owned in whole or in part by 
the manufacturer or its subsidiaries brought the issue to the fore. In 
Florida, the “Saturn” cases62 put section 320.645 before the Depart-
ment. 
 In one instance, Saturn entered into a relationship with an indi-
vidual in 1998 to be co-owner of seven Saturn dealerships. There was 
widely reported concern that the economic arrangements in the sale 
did not satisfy section 320.645. Allegedly, the individual was re-
quired to invest only one percent of the stores’ value and had to wait 
twenty years to acquire a fifty percent ownership. Was this a “signifi-
cant” investment with reasonable expectation to acquire full owner-
ship? The Department investigated and finally accepted the ar-
rangement.63 
 In a related case, Saturn asked the Department whether it could 
enter into an arrangement whereby it would be part owner of a con-
glomerate of stores—a “retail network”—under some scenario that 
                                                                                                                    
 61. Id. § 320.645(1)(b). 
 62. Cf. Donna Harris, Florida Probes Sale of Saturn Stores, AUTO. NEWS, Apr. 19, 
1999.  
 63. Donna Harris, Florida Oks Daniels’ Deal for GM Stores, AUTO. NEWS, May 24, 
1999. 
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would involve public ownership of dealerships in conjunction with a 
company partially owned by Saturn or in partnership with Saturn. 
In answering the request for a declaratory statement by Saturn Re-
tail Enterprises, Inc., and Williamson Saturn, Inc., the Department 
concluded that any arrangement in which the manufacturer had 
even indirect permanent ownership would violate the statute.64 
 The 2001 amendments to section 320.645 are in direct response to 
the Saturn cases. The amendment flatly prohibits licensees from be-
ing licensed as motor vehicle dealers pursuant to section 320.27.65 
Subsection 320.645(1)(b) has been amended to provide that a manu-
facturer is not in violation: 
When operating a motor vehicle dealership temporarily for a rea-
sonable period for the exclusive purpose of broadening the diver-
sity of its dealer body and enhancing opportunities for qualified 
persons who are part of a group that has historically been 
underrepresented in its dealer body, or for other qualified persons 
who the licensee deems to lack the resources to purchase or 
capitalize the dealership outright, in a bona fide relationship with 
an independent person, other than a licensee or its agent or 
affiliate, who has made a significant investment that is subject to 
loss in the dealership within the dealership’s first year of operation 
and who can reasonably expect to acquire full ownership of the 
dealership on reasonable terms and conditions.66 
The references to underrepresented persons is in accord with the leg-
islative purpose of section 320.605, providing that the purpose is to 
“provid[e] minorities with opportunities for full participation as mo-
tor vehicle dealers.”67 The new specificity is generally intended to 
present an obstacle to arrangements that may primarily be a conven-
ience to the manufacturer, notwithstanding the problems of proof 
that such an allegation might have. 
 The more significant amendments are the definitions of terms in-
tended to foreclose a repeat of the “Saturn” situation. The definitions 
of “independent person,” “reasonable terms and conditions,” and 
“significant investment” assure that the perceived abuse of the spirit 
of the statute would not be repeated. Practitioners know that not 
only the Saturn cases, but also contracts between independent per-
sons and manufacturers involving the purchase of the dealerships, 
have influenced these definitions. Full ownership should ordinarily 
occur within ten years and must be reasonably expected to be pur-
chased from dealership profits. The independent person must have 
                                                                                                                    
 64. In re: Saturn Retail Enters., Inc., Fla. Admin. Order (Feb. 22, 2000) (on file with 
Clerk, Fla. Dep’t High. Saf. & Motor Veh.). 
 65. FLA. STAT. § 320.645(1). 
 66. Id. § 320.645(1)(b). 
 67. Id. § 320.605.  
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“sufficient control” to permit acquisition and cannot be terminated 
“solely to avoid full ownership.” Expedited purchase must be allowed. 
All these provisions are directed at situations practitioners encounter 
from time to time in disputes which arise between “independent per-
sons” and manufacturers. Manufacturers have not been forgotten, 
however. For example, provisions for prepayment charges and costs 
may be included in agreements, and the independent person may be 
required to pay for “unrecouped restored losses”—that is, additional 
capital the manufacturer as owner has contributed to the dealership 
to make up for losses. 
 In direct response to Meteor Motors, the case in which a rental car 
company serviced new vehicles under a contract with a manufac-
turer, the newly created subsection 3 expressly authorizes relation-
ships between manufacturers and short-term rental companies. 
However, what is given with one hand is limited with the other. 
Rental companies may sell only vehicles used in the rental business, 
and financing provided by these companies to retail customers for 
the purchase of vehicles is limited to the purchase of used motor ve-
hicles.68 
 A curious feature of the revised section 320.645 is the “carve out” 
for distributors. This section of the 2000 statute exempted dealer-
ships owned by manufacturers prior to May 31, 1984.69 The provision 
has since been deleted. The 2001 statute allows a “licensee-
distributor” not owned by a manufacturer “that has owned and oper-
ated a motor vehicle dealership in this state on or before July 1, 
1996,” to own and operate a dealership that does not sell or service 
the line-make distributed by the distributor.70 This provision is curi-
ous indeed and can only be ad hominem. There is nothing in the his-
tory of section 320.645 to suggest that July 1, 1996, is a significant 
date. Moreover, there is no obvious reason for favoring distributors 
over other licensees, and one is prompted to ask how the distributor 
was operating the dealership legally after 1984, unless it also met 
the pre-May 31, 1984, exception. The reasonable inference is that a 
powerful interest was at work in securing this exception. 
 A comparison with the provisions of House Bill 1239 illustrates 
the competing interests that shaped the final version of the section 
320.645 amendments. Under that bill, a licensee would have had to 
certify in writing that “the dealer development arrangement is bona 
fide and is not an attempt by the licensee to own, operate, or control 
one or more dealerships in this state.”71 It would have created a di-
                                                                                                                    
 68. Id. § 320.645(3)(a). 
 69. Id. § 320.645(2) (2000) (amended 2001).  
 70. Id. § 320.645(4) (2001). 
 71. Fla. HB 1239, § 8 (2001) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.645(2)(b)). 
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rect cause of action to test compliance with the statute, running not 
only to the Department, which would be given subpoena power,72 but 
to “any person.”73 In direct response to the multiple ownership ar-
rangement in the Saturn cases, no person would be allowed to be in 
more than one ownership arrangement with a licensee.74 The bill 
would have further provided that even in a legitimate relationship, 
the licensee would be expressly prohibited from discriminating, pre-
sumably by favoring its own dealership, over its other dealers.75 The 
bill also provided a definition of “significant investment” that re-
quired the initial investment of the independent person to be “not 
less than 6 percent”76 of the overall investment considering the fair 
market value of the dealership. On the other hand, the rental com-
pany exception and the distributor ownership section were not fea-
tures of the bill. 
 In general, the history and final version of the amendments to 
section 320.645 illustrate the compromises in amending the Act. Re-
sponse to a general concern by dealers, given focus by specific cases, 
prompted the effort to amend. The manufacturers’ response was to 
generalize the language of the amendment and to lessen the prospect 
of existing dealers bringing actions to test the validity of every sub-
section (1)(b) dealership arrangement. The “licensee-distributor” ex-
ception is a clear example of lobbying power. Those who may have to 
defend the statute in the future will doubtless be grateful for the sev-
erability provision in case this provision is so specific that it cannot 
sustain a “rational basis” attack.77 On the face of the statute, it is 
hard to see what state purpose could be served by discriminating in 
favor of one class of licensee. 
C.   Increasing the Act’s Dealer Protection 
 Section 320.64 establishes the grounds for denying, suspending, or 
revoking a licensee’s application or license. When one compares the 
subsections of section 320.64 to those of section 320.27(9), the analo-
gous section for the denying, suspending, or revoking of dealer li-
censes, one is struck by the concentration on acts which directly af-
fect consumers in the dealer licensing statute as compared to the 
concentration on acts which affect dealers in the manufacturer li-
censing section. The amendments to this list are especially instruc-
tive of the dealer concerns that have developed in the industry since 
the last significant amendments. 
                                                                                                                    
 72. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.645(5)). 
 73. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.645(3)). 
 74. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.645(2)(b)). 
 75. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.645(4)). 
 76. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.645(6)(b)). 
 77. FLA. STAT. § 320.6991 (2001). 
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1.   Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers v. Hull78  
and Florida’s 2001 Legislation 
 Perhaps the most comprehensive recent state regulation focusing 
on potential incursions by manufacturers into dealers’ traditional 
profit centers can be seen in the 2000 amendments to the Arizona 
dealer statute. The Arizona Legislature passed House Bill 2101, codi-
fied as section 28-4460, Arizona Revised Statutes, which created a 
new section entitled “Factories; competition or unfair discrimination 
prohibited; definitions.”79 As the title indicates, this section deals 
with various areas in which a manufacturer might be perceived as a 
competitor with its dealers or seen as having unfairly granted a com-
petitive advantage to some dealers over others. Arizona created a 
prohibition against: manufacturer ownership in section 28-4460(B)1; 
direct sales to consumers by manufacturers in section 28-4460(B)2; 
“controlling any aspect of the final amount charged”80 for a vehicle or 
vehicle financing in section 28-4460(B)3; refusing to provide all mod-
els manufactured to each dealer and at a price no greater than to any 
other dealer in the country in section 28-4460(B)4; and providing or 
directing all “leads”81 to the dealer nearest the address of the lead. 
 Two manufacturer associations challenged provisions of the stat-
ute on a variety of constitutional grounds. The order of the court was 
on the plaintiffs’ motion for temporary injunctive relief. The court 
concluded: 
While plaintiffs have presented arguments that may hold merit 
upon the development of a more comprehensive factual record, 
they have not met their burden at this stage of the proceedings, 
due, in large part, to their failure in proving the balance of hard-
ships tips decidedly in their favor or that any irreparable harm 
would result from denial of an injunction.82 
Nonetheless, the court provided considerable constitutional analysis. 
Because a number of the Arizona statute’s concepts have been en-
acted or were proposed for the Florida Act, a brief review of the 
court’s constitutional analysis is in order. 
 First, Hull does not question the right of the state to regulate this 
area. 
The present statute is not an entirely new proposition. Arizona has 
regulated the automobile industry and the relationship between 
                                                                                                                    
 78. 137 F. Supp. 2d 1165 (D. Ariz. 2001), appeal docketed, No. 01-15940 (9th Cir. 
2001). 
 79. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-4460 (2000).  
 80. Id. § 28-4460(B)3.   
 81. See id. § 28-4301(16) (2000) (stating that a lead is one’s expressed interest in pur-
chasing a product).  
 82. Hull, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1177. 
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manufacturers and dealers for several years. Title 28 regulates the 
automobile manufacturers’ business transactions in this State, 
preventing the manufacturers from competing with their dealer 
franchisees. See A.R.S. § 28-4333(A) and § 28-4334(A). Such fran-
chise laws keep the disparity of power between manufacturers and 
dealers in check. Similar regulations exist in nearly every State. 
See generally, New Motor Vehicle Board of California v. Orrin W. 
Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 99 S.Ct. 403, 58 L.Ed.2d 361 (1978) (recogniz-
ing State interest in regulating dealer-manufacturer relationship); 
Tober Foreign Motors, Inc. v. Reiter Oldsmobile, Inc., 376 Mass. 
313, 381 N.E.2d 908 (1978) (explaining rationale behind State 
regulation of dealer-manufacturer relationship).83 
As the court observes in the parenthetical, the United States Su-
preme Court has indicated that a state has the power to regulate the 
manufacturer-dealer relationship without being in conflict with 
antitrust laws.84 The plaintiffs in Hull, however, attacked the new 
legislation on a number of constitutional grounds, including the First 
Amendment, the Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, the 
Takings Clause, and vagueness.85 
 a.   The Threat of Information v. The First Amendment.—“The 
essence of plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge is that the operative 
effect of subsections (B)(3) [prohibition against controlling any aspect 
of amount charged for vehicles or services] and C(1) [definition of 
‘controlling’] taken together prevents vehicle manufacturers from 
publishing pricing information about vehicles and other products on 
their Internet Web sites.”86 The key to the court’s ruling on this issue 
rests on the fact that the court interpreted the claim as an “as 
applied” challenge.87 The factual record was too fragmented to 
support a temporary injunction on this ground.88 Framing the issue, 
however, is revealing. 
 The Internet is a strong and growing force in commerce. Dealers 
are concerned that consumer access to Internet information put forth 
by manufacturers will unfairly influence pricing. Thus, publication of 
“average” selling prices, or “available” financing rates, or “recom-
mended” selling prices, other than the federally required new car 
manufacturer’s suggested retail price,89 in dealers’ eyes represent 
threats to dealers’ ability to make a reasonable profit. 
 House Bill 1239 sought to introduce the exact language of section 
28-4460(B)(3), Arizona Revised Statutes, adding the phrase at the 
                                                                                                                    
 83. Id. at 1168. 
 84. New Motor Vehicle Bd. of Cal. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978). 
 85. Hull, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1169.  
 86. Id. at 1170. 
 87. Id. at 1171-72.  
 88. Id. at 1171. 
 89. 15 U.S.C. § 1232 (2000). 
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end of the first sentence “or has charged the dealer more than 90 
percent of the manufacturer’s suggested retail price for a motor vehi-
cle” and substituting the word “influencing” for “controlling.”90 
Clearly, the Florida dealer lobby wished to go one step further than 
Arizona. This language did not pass. However, another section was 
approved that may achieve a similar purpose. 
 Section 320.64(28), Florida Statutes, now makes the following a 
prohibited act: 
The applicant or licensee has published, disclosed, or otherwise 
made available in any form information provided by a motor vehi-
cle dealer with respect to sales prices of motor vehicles or profit per 
motor vehicle sold. Other confidential financial information pro-
vided by motor vehicle dealers shall not be published, disclosed, or 
otherwise made publicly available except in composite form. How-
ever, this information may be disclosed with the written consent of 
the dealer or in response to a subpoena or order of the Depart-
ment, a court or a lawful tribunal, or introduced into evidence in 
such a proceeding, after timely notice to an affected dealer.91 
House Bill 1239 contained a provision on the same subject which 
read: 
The applicant or licensee has published, disclosed, or otherwise 
made available any information, including composite information, 
obtained from any motor vehicle dealer or dealers, including, with-
out limitation, selling or leasing prices of motor vehicles or profit 
per motor vehicle sold or leased.92 
Section 320.64(28) represents a compromise with the House Bill 1239 
provision that partially addresses the problem that the Arizona stat-
ute addresses. The selling price of a new vehicle is provided to the 
manufacturer by its dealer. Section 320.64(28) prohibits disclosure of 
sales price or profit information provided by the dealer in any form. 
Read in conjunction with the provision that “other confidential in-
formation” may be disclosed in composite form, the first sentence will 
forbid the disclosure of sales information even in composite form. 
Thus, a manufacturer may not publish an “average” new vehicle 
price for the dealer’s area because the only way to calculate such a 
price would be in part from pricing information supplied by the 
dealer. This provision does not address the “price” of financing and 
other services, but it should effectively address the question of new 
motor vehicle prices on manufacturers’ Web sites. It may also be 
more resistent to a First Amendment challenge than the Arizona 
statute, whose constitutional fate is yet to be decided, or the analo-
                                                                                                                    
 90. Fla. HB 1239, § 4 (2001) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.64(36)). 
 91. FLA. STAT. § 320.6408 (2001).  
 92. Fla. HB 1239, § 4 (2001) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.64(32)). 
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gous provision of House Bill 1239, because it is drawn more narrowly 
and protects confidential information rather than making sweeping 
prohibitions against commercial speech. 
 Practitioners will especially understand the compromise nature of 
the provision. The disclosure portions are prompted by discovery dis-
putes that arise especially in administrative litigation under section 
320.642, Florida Statutes, in which an existing dealer protests the 
establishment of another same line-make dealer in its area. In this 
form of litigation, the opposing parties often seek discovery of details 
of each other’s financial operations. Obviously, this information could 
be quite valuable to competitors and is correspondingly sensitive to 
those whose information it is. The statute as it stands favors 
nondisclosure but does not forbid it on a proper showing. The practi-
cal effect will be that such discovery, if allowed, will be allowed only 
in summary form. Thus the statute will go far to narrow the argu-
ments in future motions to compel discovery. 
 b.   The Internet, the Commerce Clause, and Vagueness.—The Hull 
plaintiffs claimed that the Arizona statute violated the Commerce 
Clause by prohibiting a manufacturer “from selling, leasing or 
providing, or offering to sell, lease or provide, vehicles or products, 
services or financing to any retail customer or lead.”93 The Hull court 
noted that the plaintiffs did not question the right of the state to 
prohibit manufacturers from competing with their dealers. The court 
suggested that any attempt to do so would be futile in view of the 
precedent of Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland.94 What the 
plaintiffs did claim was that the ban on peripheral products, rather 
than the sale of new vehicles, made the case distinguishable from 
Exxon.95 The court, however, saw no such distinction.96 
 The 2001 legislature has created an analogous prohibition to the 
Arizona statute in two new subsections of section 320.64: 
 (23) The applicant or licensee has competed or is competing 
with respect to any activity covered by the franchise agreement 
with the motor vehicle dealer of the same line-make located in this 
state with whom the applicant or licensee has entered into a fran-
chise agreement, except as permitted in s. 320.645. 
 (24) The applicant or licensee has sold a motor vehicle to any 
retail consumer in the state except through a motor vehicle dealer 
holding a franchise agreement for the line-make that includes the 
motor vehicle. This section does not apply to sales by the applicant 
or licensee of motor vehicles to its current employees, employees of 
                                                                                                                    
 93. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 28-4460(B)2 (2000); see Hull, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1173-74. 
 94. 437 U.S. 117 (1978). 
 95. Hull, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1174. 
 96. Id. 
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companies affiliated by common ownership, charitable not-for-
profit-organizations, and the federal government.97 
These provisions cut off direct sales of new motor vehicles to Florida 
consumers by manufacturers over the Internet. In most cases, it 
would also preclude used vehicle sales, because most manufacturers 
in their franchise agreements require their dealers to sell used vehi-
cles. The same is true of service and the sale of parts and accessories, 
which are also required dealer activities under the franchise agree-
ments. Thus, experiments in the recent past with manufacturer-
owned service facilities would not be allowed because they would 
compete with an existing dealer. The same would apply to direct sale 
of factory approved parts and accessories to independent suppliers. 
What is not directly prohibited by these sections is the direct sale of 
financing products. This latter factor may be the distinguishing fea-
ture between the Florida statutes and their Arizona analogue, if the 
“collateral” products portion of the Arizona statute is ultimately 
found to offend the Commerce Clause.98 
 A common aspect of regulation of manufacturers is the criminaliz-
ing of violations. Section 320.70, Florida Statutes, establishes such 
criminal penalties:  
Any person being a manufacturer, factory branch, or factory repre-
sentative, who violates any provision of ss. 320.61-320.70, or who 
does any act enumerated in s. 320.64 as a ground for the denial, 
suspension or revocation of a license, shall be guilty of a misde-
meanor of the first degree, punishable as provided in s. 775.082 or 
s. 775.083.99  
There is no reported case in which a manufacturer has been charged 
under section 320.70. The presence of the section, however, raises 
special constitutional issues. 
 Because there is a possible criminal penalty for violating a section 
of the Act, its provisions are open to enhanced scrutiny for vague-
ness. The Arizona court opined that the plaintiffs “raise a legitimate 
concern” about the interpretation of what activities would be in-
cluded under “competition” as a defined term.100 The court made no 
ruling on this claim but, based on the state’s clarifications, concluded 
                                                                                                                    
 97. FLA. STAT. § 320.64(23), (24) (2001).  
 98. The state in Hull will take comfort from the ruling in Ford Motor Co. v. Texas 
Dep’t of Transp., 264 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2001). The Fifth Circuit found that article 
4413(36), section 5.02(c) of the Texas Revised Civil Statutes forbid manufacturers from 
“acting in the capacity of a dealer” and rendered them ineligible for a dealer’s license. 
Therefore, the statute prevented Ford from selling used vehicles over its Web site through 
an arrangement with local dealers. The statute was found to be constitutional against chal-
lenges very similar to those brought against the Arizona statute. 
 99. FLA. STAT. § 320.70.  
 100. Hull, 137 F. Supp. 2d at 1176. 
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that the plaintiffs could not bear their burden of showing imminent 
harm.101 Based on the Hull court’s analysis, it remains an open ques-
tion whether “compete” is sufficiently vague so that a manufacturer 
would not be able to know whether its actions were criminal. If it is 
squarely decided at some point in the history of Hull that the statute 
is unconstitutionally vague, it is likely that manufacturers will at-
tack section 320.64(23). The question will surely come up if there is a 
civil or administrative suit against a manufacturer based on a claim 
that the manufacturer has violated one of these provisions. 
2.   A Bigger, Brawnier Section 320.64 
 The 2001 amendments to section 320.64, Florida Statutes, as well 
as the proposed amendments which did not pass, could be 
commentary on the headlines from the industry trade journals on is-
sues of conflict and tension between dealers and manufacturers. In 
addition to the changes already discussed, the legislature has ad-
dressed the allocation of new models to existing dealers, audits by 
manufacturers of warranty payments or sales incentive programs, 
and alternative dispute clauses in franchise agreements. 
 a.   New Vehicle Models to All Dealers.—A major concern of some 
dealers in recent years has been the effort of certain manufacturers 
to condition allocation of a distinctive new model to be added to a 
line-make upon a dealer attaining performance goals or providing 
modifications to its facilities. For example, when Oldsmobile 
launched its Aurora model, there was much noise that dealers would 
not receive the model unless they achieved certain performance 
goals. Oldsmobile ultimately did not follow through. Volvo required 
dealers with facilities it considered inferior to upgrade in order to 
receive the S70 when it added the vehicle to its line in 1998. More 
recently, BMW has attempted to offer dealers a separate franchise 
agreement to sell its X5 sport utility vehicle, which will not be 
available to dealers with the standard BMW agreement. That 
decision has led to litigation in Texas. 
 Texas has a statute making it unlawful for a manufacturer to  
refuse to offer to its same line-make franchised dealers all models 
manufactured for that line-make, or require a dealer to pay any 
extra fee, purchase unreasonable advertising displays or other ma-
terials, or remodel, renovate, or recondition the dealer’s existing 
facilities as a prerequisite to receiving a model or series of vehi-
cles.102  
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 102. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. art. 4413(36), § 5.02(b)(26) (2001). 
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The Texas Motor Vehicle Board overturned an administrative law 
judge’s recommendation and ruled that the X5 was a car, not a truck, 
so that franchised dealers must receive the vehicle.103 In 2001, Flor-
ida’s legislature passed a similar provision. 
 Section 320.64(22) has replaced previous section 320.64(13). The 
provision previously focused on prohibiting manufacturers from re-
fusing to provide dealers with reasonable quantities of vehicles and 
other products in a timely manner, a provision intended to prohibit 
selective allocation of hot selling models. Section 320.64(22) added 
the following: 
Such refusal includes failure to offer to its same line-make fran-
chised motor vehicle dealers all models manufactured for that line-
make, or requiring [sic] a dealer to pay any extra fee, require a 
dealer to execute a separate franchise agreement, purchase unrea-
sonable advertising displays or other materials, or remodel, reno-
vate, or recondition the dealer’s existing facilities, or provide ex-
clusive facilities as a prerequisite to receiving a model or series of 
vehicles. 
Florida has gone Texas one better by adding the “no new franchise” 
provision expressly to the statute. Those in the industry will recog-
nize the motivation for the “provide exclusive facilities” language. An 
ongoing struggle between manufacturers and dealers has developed 
out of the manufacturers’ desire to have exclusive representation in a 
facility for their products and dealers’ desire to represent several 
manufacturers in facilities designed to give the dealer maximum 
economy of scale. In fact, many dealerships represent more than one 
line-make from a facility. The introduction of a new product is an oc-
casion for a manufacturer to exert pressure on its “dualled” dealers 
to provide exclusive facilities for the line-make in order to receive the 
product. 
 The new provision clearly protects dealers from such “power 
plays” by manufacturers. One wonders, however, if the new legisla-
tion may produce an unwanted consequence. Section 320.60(14) pro-
vides the following definition: “‘Line-make vehicles’ are those motor 
vehicles which are offered for sale, lease, or distribution under a 
common name, trademark, service mark, or brand name of the 
manufacturer of same.” A visit to Ford’s Web site reveals a picture of 
a Thunderbird, an Explorer, and an F-150 with the caption “FORD 
VEHICLES” beneath. Ford has routinely given its dealers two fran-
chise agreements, one for light trucks and one for cars. Other manu-
facturers who sell both cars and trucks do the same. There is, how-
ever, a significant definitional question in the modern motor vehicle 
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environment as to what is a car and what is a truck. The industry 
has treated sport utility vehicles as trucks because they are built on 
a truck frame or “platform.” Many of these vehicles are not what 
“trucks” have been traditionally thought to be, as the Texas BMW 
case illustrates. “Light” trucks, such as the Ford F-150, which have a 
heritage as “working” vehicles used to haul pay loads, especially on 
farms or construction sites, are now being designed primarily to car-
ry passengers, with interiors outfitted for passenger comfort and sus-
pensions designed for a smooth ride. 
 This raises an interesting question. To use the Ford example, 
while Ford car dealers are also given a Ford “light truck” franchise 
allowing them to sell the F-150 and F-250, and some have “medium” 
truck licenses allowing them to sell F-350s and F-450s, there are 
some truck dealers selling medium and heavy duty trucks of various 
line-makes who also have a franchise to sell Ford “light” trucks. On 
the basis of the new section 320.64(22), read as it is written and in 
light of the statutory definition of “line-make vehicles” and Ford’s 
own advertising, these “truck only” dealers will have an argument for 
demanding Ford ship them passenger cars. 
 b.   Manufacturer Audits.—Two important sources of income for 
dealers are warranty reimbursements and manufacturer rebate pro-
grams. Warranty reimbursements are moneys paid to dealers for re-
pairing vehicles covered by the manufacturer’s standard vehicle war-
ranty. Dealers file claims with the manufacturer for reimbursement 
for parts and labor, which is paid to the dealer on a periodic basis.104 
Unless there is some obvious mistake in the claim, manufacturers 
generally pay as a matter of course, usually as an entry in the “open” 
account used to account for money owed the dealer by the manufac-
turer for such claims and money owed the manufacturer by the 
dealer for the purchase of parts and accessories. However, manufac-
turers have accounting teams which audit dealership warranty re-
imbursement claims from time to time and sometimes disallow some 
of the claims. The manufacturer then “charges back” these disal-
lowed claims in the “open” account. Sometimes the sums can be quite 
large, causing havoc to the dealer’s cash position. Some “charge 
backs” are occasioned by fraudulent practices unearthed by the audi-
tors; much more often they are the result of failures to abide by the 
manufacturer’s procedures in making the claim—disagreements over 
the amount that properly could be claimed for the service performed 
or disputes over whether the repair was covered by the warranty. 
Dealer complaints about this auditing process center principally on 
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audits that go back many months and that demand repayment of re-
imbursements made years before. Sometimes, the audits even occur 
long after the year’s accounting has closed, occasioning a large loss 
that could not have been anticipated in the ordinary course of busi-
ness. Sometimes the “charge backs” are based on hypertechnical vio-
lations of the claim procedures. 
 The 2001 legislature has addressed this concern in section 
320.64(25). This subsection makes it an express violation to fail to 
comply with section 320.696 (requiring prompt payment of claims), 
giving greater focus to a statute already on the books. It limits audit 
“look back” periods to one year following the payment of the claim, 
and section 320.64(25) limits the bases on which a claim may be de-
nied. The manufacturer 
shall not deny a claim or charge a motor vehicle dealer back sub-
sequent to the payment of a claim unless the [manufacturer] can 
show that the claim was false or fraudulent or that the motor vehi-
cle dealer failed to substantially comply with the reasonable writ-
ten and uniformly applied procedures of the [manufacturer] for 
such repairs or incentives.105 
In addition, section 320.64(30) now expressly prohibits a manufac-
turer from conducting any audit in order to coerce a dealer to forego 
its rights. On the other hand, section 320.64(25) specifically acknowl-
edges the right of the manufacturer to “periodically audit” in order to 
determine “the validity of paid claims.”106 
 This subsection exhibits the balance achieved by the process of 
party lobbying in the legislative process. A comparison with the pro-
posed subsection presented in House Bill 1239 illustrates the point. 
That bill would have required reimbursement for any repair to cor-
rect a “defective condition” that was “desirable to prevent deteriora-
tion of any part of or the value of the motor vehicle, or to correct a po-
tential safety hazard” unless the manufacturer proved, by clear and 
convincing evidence, that the repair was unnecessary or not per-
formed, or that the dealer substantially failed to justify the claim in 
any reasonable fashion.107 It forbade audits of actual time spent, the 
custom being often to receive payment for “book time”—that is, the 
time “allowed” for the repair by the manufacturer’s service manual. 
Book time is measured irrespective of the actual time the repair took. 
Dealers who pay their mechanics on book time but receive payment 
for actual time commonly complain about this method of measure-
ment.108 Finally, it required a written, detailed explanation of the 
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reason for any “charge back,” and a period for the dealer to file a 
challenge. During the challenge, the manufacturer may not take any 
action to collect the “charge back” from the dealer’s accounts. 
Additionally, a successful challenging dealer is provided a remedy of 
double the amount “charged back” and attorney’s fees.109  
 These proposals directly address the following dealer complaints: 
that manufacturers refuse to pay for reasonably necessary repairs 
not contemplated in the “fine print” of the warranty; that any rea-
sonable substantiation of work done should suffice to support a claim 
and not the strict compliance with difficult claims documentation 
procedures; that manufacturers take sums of money from the dealers 
based solely on the results of the audit even when the results are in 
dispute; and that warranty “charge backs” are often in amounts mak-
ing it commercially uneconomical to hire attorneys to pursue the 
claims. 
 The statute that passed addresses the main complaints but in 
substantially reduced form from the prospective of dealers. Nonethe-
less, the limitation on the claims subject to audit and the “substan-
tial compliance” language should go far in leveling the playing field 
between manufacturer and dealer in this area of their business. 
 In addition to warranty reimbursements, special incentive pro-
grams related to new vehicle sales are a substantial source of income 
for dealers. These programs encourage dealers to sell certain vehicle 
models, or a certain number of new vehicles, during a specific time 
period. Dealers are given a rebate for each qualifying sale under 
these type of programs. Often the dealer receives nothing unless it 
meets the program objectives, but upon reaching the objective, the 
dealer receives a rebate for all vehicles sold. Other programs encour-
age “fleet sales”—that is, bulk sales of new vehicles to a single buyer 
such as a rental car company. These sales are usually negotiated at a 
very low profit margin for the dealer. They tend not to be ordinarily 
attractive, as they would use up vehicle inventory without a good re-
turn. Such sales are important to manufacturers, however, because 
they serve as a sort of advertisement, putting rental customers, for 
example, in a virtual test drive. This in return increases vehicle 
sales. To support such sales, manufacturers give incentives to the 
dealer, often by paying the dealer a set amount for each vehicle sold 
in a qualifying fleet transaction. 
 The incentive payments can be quite large, and manufacturers 
audit claims for incentive payments to ensure the rules of the pro-
grams have been followed. But as with warranty audits, these audits 
often occur long after the program has finished or after the fleet in-
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centive has been paid. In these cases, disputes may arise between 
dealers and auditors over whether a vehicle sale qualifies for the 
program. A frequent bone of contention, especially in Florida, is pro-
hibition against the sale of vehicles for export. Many manufacturers 
prohibit their dealers from selling for export and disallow such sales 
in their incentive programs. However, there is a significant market 
in exported vehicles, which in many countries can be sold at a profit 
even after they have been purchased at retail and shipped to the fi-
nal purchasers. Florida dealers especially object to being cut off from 
such sales. Manufacturers, however, counter that to permit domestic 
dealers to export undermines their relations with foreign dealers. 
Even more galling than the prohibition, manufacturers follow the 
history of vehicles, either by periodic checks at ports or by noting 
that a vehicle has not been brought in for warranty work. Sales of 
vehicles that manufacturers believe have been exported are disal-
lowed on a “strict liability” basis—that is, regardless of whether the 
dealer had any knowledge of an intent to export the vehicle. The ob-
vious dealer complaint is that the dealer should not be responsible 
for what a consumer does with a vehicle after it has been sold. 
 Collectively, new sections 320.64(25) and 320.64(26) address this 
question. Incentive audits are limited to an eighteen-month “look 
back” period (section 320.64(25)). Manufacturers are additionally 
prohibited from penalizing dealers, in any way, from selling directly 
to a customer at the dealership without dealer knowledge of the cus-
tomer’s intent to export. Titling in one of the fifty states provides a 
rebuttable presumption that the dealer was without knowledge (sec-
tion 320.64(26)). 
 Again, House Bill 1239 would have gone much further. One sec-
tion provided an analogous program to that proposed for warranty 
audits.110 Another flatly prohibited a “not for export” policy by manu-
facturers.111 Comparison with the legislation that was passed imme-
diately shows the compromise. Manufacturers must audit within 
eighteen months of payment or waive the right to charge back, but 
they retain the right to make reasonable rules. Dealers must sub-
stantially follow the rules but are relieved from the “strict liability” 
associated with sales of vehicles later exported without the dealer’s 
knowledge. 
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 c.   Alternative Dispute Resolution.—This is not the place for a 
comprehensive discussion of the growing legal debate over 
arbitration clauses in form contracts. Suffice to say that arbitration 
is a favored form of dispute resolution for any dispute falling under 
the Federal Arbitration Act,112 and such clauses have been broadly 
enforced in state and federal court.113 Nonetheless, several states 
have prohibitions against mandatory arbitration provisions in 
manufacturers’ franchise agreements.114 However, the one appellate 
decision on point has declared that such statutes are unenforceable 
on preemption grounds by the Federal Arbitration Act.115 Diving into 
this stream, the 2001 legislature attempted to provide significant 
relief to dealers while avoiding the problem of preemption. 
 Section 320.64(31), Florida Statutes, creates the following viola-
tion: 
From and after the effective date of enactment of this provision, 
the applicant or licensee has offered to any motor vehicle dealer a 
franchise agreement that: 
 (a) Requires that a motor vehicle dealer bring an administra-
tive or legal action in a venue outside of this state; 
 (b) Requires that any arbitration, mediation, or other legal 
proceeding be conducted outside this state; or 
 (c) Requires that a law of a state other than Florida be applied 
to any legal proceeding between a motor vehicle dealer and a licen-
see.116 
Many franchise agreements have choice of law clauses specifying the 
state law in which the manufacturer’s principal place of business is 
located, rather than the dealer’s state. Others have choice of venue 
clauses setting venue outside the dealer’s state, and some require ar-
bitration or mediation in a place outside Florida. 
 This again is not the place to discuss the relative advantages or 
disadvantages of arbitration in the settlement of disputes between 
very large corporations and relatively small corporations. However, it 
is clearly a burden on dealers to be forced to seek redress in a distant 
place, whether judicially or in alternative dispute resolution. It is 
likewise an imposition on a Florida dealer to be forced to deal with 
the laws of another state. As there is nothing in section 320.64(31) 
prohibiting arbitration or mandatory mediation provisions, nothing 
                                                                                                                    
 112. Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2000). 
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is likely preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act. Nonetheless, in 
passing this provision, the legislature has heeded a significant dealer 
complaint and provided significant relief. 
 d.   Other Dealer Proposals.—House Bill 1239 contains some other 
notable proposals that were not enacted into law but clearly were 
intended to address specific dealer concerns. One such concern 
involves manufacturer programs that “certify” dealerships as 
meeting specific standards of performance and/or facilities. These 
standards, however, may be very expensive to meet. Chrysler’s “Five 
Star” and Ford’s “Blue Oval” are examples. The fear is that some 
dealers will not qualify for these programs and will not be given 
special incentives such as favorable financing or leasing terms. These 
incentives are provided to qualifying competitors, which the 
competitors in turn offer their customers, thus placing nonqualifying 
dealers in a disadvantageous position. House Bill 1239 would have 
required the manufacturer to offer any variation in pricing, whether 
directly or by way of special rebates based on the unwillingness of a 
dealer to take certain actions necessary to become a certified 
program dealer, to all its dealers.117 
 Another concern of dealers is that financing subsidiaries of manu-
facturers, such as General Motors Acceptance Corporation, Chrysler 
Financial Corporation or Ford Motor Credit Company, have in the 
past attempted to encourage dealers to use more of their services by 
offering preferred rates to “volume” customers. These companies 
provide commercial financing to dealers and “buy” retail sales con-
tracts from the dealers. Major issues are “floor plan” financing and 
“A paper.” Floor plan financing programs, used by virtually all deal-
ers, provide financing to the dealer for the purchase of its new, and 
often used, vehicle inventories. The manufacturer sells the vehicle to 
the dealer, or the dealer buys a used vehicle from one of many auc-
tions, and payment is made by the financing source, which is repaid 
when the vehicle is sold. “A paper” refers to the retail sales contract 
made by dealers with vehicle buyers who have exceptional credit. 
Dealers receive a payment from the lenders when they assign the re-
tail sales contract, usually based on a small percentage of the princi-
pal amount of the contract. Standard lenders prefer these contracts 
because they have fewer collection problems than contracts with 
buyers with lower credit ratings.  
 In return for using the floor plan and giving preferential treat-
ment in the placement of “A paper,” these financing companies have 
from time to time offered the preferred dealers better financing for 
long-term leases to consumers than they would give to another same-
line dealer. Dealers who do not want to participate in these pro-
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grams, usually dealers who have their floor plan with another lender 
or have other established “A paper” sources, feel threatened in the 
competitive market by the favorable terms available to competing 
dealers. House Bill 1239 would have prohibited such practices.118 
There are obvious arguments against such a statute. For manufac-
turers to offer incentives to customers—in this case the dealers—to 
gain their business is quite normal, and this sort of competition for 
business ultimately benefits consumers in the form of lower leasing 
rates. Indeed, this was not one of the proposals that made it through 
the legislative process. 
D.   When Things Fall Apart: Changes to the Franchise  
Termination Process 
 Perhaps the aspect of the manufacturer-dealer relationship of 
greatest ultimate concern to dealers is the power of the manufac-
turer to end the relationship. Franchise contracts uniformly contain 
provisions delineating the grounds upon which the manufacturer 
may terminate the agreement. Moreover, many are term agree-
ments; that is, they are entered into for a term of years and, like 
any other contract, end when the term is completed. These contract 
provisions are the ultimate in superior bargaining power. Dealers 
invest large amounts of money in purchasing or leasing properties 
to provide facilities from which to sell the manufacturer’s products. 
These are single purpose facilities and long-term commitments that 
dealers are left with if their agreements are terminated. Moreover, 
consumers are affected if the dealer from whom they have bought 
their new vehicle is no longer there to serve them. Notwithstand-
ing, the market conditions in recent years have led some manufac-
turers to reduce their dealer bodies. The widely publicized phase 
out of Oldsmobile dealers is an example. Consequently, termination 
or nonrenewal is a major concern for dealers. 
 Florida has addressed this concern in section 320.641. As with 
other portions of the 2001 Act, the amendments of section 320.641 
are direct reactions to dealer concerns and case law. Comparison 
between the final language in Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 
1956 and proposed House Bill 1239 illustrates well the industry 
conflicts that were resolved in the 2001 legislature. 
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1.   When Can a Manufacturer Discontinue, Cancel, Fail to Renew, 
Modify, or Replace a Dealer’s Franchise Agreement? 
 a.   Termination.—“Termination” is not found in section 320.641. 
Rather, the phrase “discontinue, cancel, or fail to renew a franchise 
agreement”119 is used to define the ways in which a manufacturer 
may “terminate” its franchise with a dealer. In short, section 320.641 
applies to any attempt to end the franchise relationship. 
Manufacturers are not, of course, forbidden to terminate agreements 
with their dealers. Rather, if they wish to do so, they must follow the 
procedures provided by the statute. Essentially, a manufacturer 
must notify both the dealer and the Department of its intention to 
terminate a dealer at least ninety days before the termination is to 
be effective, or fifteen days if the reason for termination is 
abandonment of the dealership.120 If the dealer files a protest with 
the Department within the ninety-day notice period, a determination 
is made as to whether the proposed termination is “unfair or 
prohibited” and the proposed termination is stayed.121 The question is 
what grounds may a manufacturer cite for termination? Over this 
question the manufacturers and the dealers parted ways. 
 Prior to the 2001 legislation, section 320.641(3) read: 
[D]iscontinuation, cancellation, or nonrenewal of a franchise 
agreement is unfair if it is not clearly permitted by the franchise 
agreement; is not undertaken in good faith; is not undertaken for 
good cause; or is based on an alleged breach of the franchise 
agreement which is not in fact a material and substantial 
breach.122 
The 2001 legislature added the following language after “substantial 
breach”: “or, if the grounds relied upon for termination, cancellation, 
or nonrenewal have not been applied in a uniform and consistent 
manner by the licensee.” The question of establishing the basis for 
termination has plagued the statute. Prior to 1984, the criterion was 
whether the dealer was “unfairly cancelled.”123 In 1984, the “unfair or 
prohibited” language entered.124 In 1988, the legislature added the 
                                                                                                                    
 119. FLA. STAT. § 320.641(1)(a). 
 120. Id. § 320.641(1)(a), (5).  
 121. Id. § 320.641(3). A curious feature of the procedural law in this area, not ad-
dressed by the 2001 legislature, is that while the notice of termination in the case of aban-
donment is a fifteen-day notice, the case law has established that nonetheless, an affected 
dealer has ninety days in which to file an opposition. Gen. Motors Corp. v. Gus Machado 
Buick-GMC, Inc., 581 So. 2d 637, 638 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991). Section 320.641(3) also does not 
expressly say that the petition or complaint is to the Department; section 320.699(1), how-
ever, allows for the petition to the Department. See also FLA. STAT. § 320.695 (reference to 
determination under section 320.641(3) by the Department).  
 122. FLA. STAT. § 320.641(3) (2000). 
 123. See id. § 320.641(3) (1983). 
 124. See id. § 320.641(3) (1985). 
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pre-2001 language, elaborating somewhat on “unfair or prohibited.” 
Nonetheless, the statute continues to be interpreted in the light of 
International Harvester Co. v. Calvin.125 The following interpretation 
is typical: 
to determine whether the termination in this case was unfair or 
prohibited, an examination must be made of those grounds set 
forth in the Agreement which would allow termina-
tion/cancellation; the good faith in deciding to terminate; whether 
termination was for good cause and whether the breaches of the 
Agreement, if any, were material and substantial. In assessing 
such matters, the Petitioner has the burden of demonstrating that 
the intended cancellation is unfair or prohibited. See International 
Harvester Co. v. Calvin, 353 So.2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977).126 
The 2001 Act squarely addresses the question of burden. Although 
the dealer must initiate the administrative action, the manufacturer 
now bears the burden. 
 The shift in burden may affect proof in termination cases. For-
merly “not clearly permitted”; “not in good faith”; “not for good 
cause”; or “material and substantial breach” if breach had been 
claimed, had to be proved by the dealer. With the changed burden, 
the manufacturer may have more difficulty proving good faith than 
defending against a dealer trying to prove bad faith. Moreover, a 
common basis for termination based on breach is the failure of the 
dealer to meet performance objectives in vehicle sales and customer 
service.127 A common defense by dealers has been “I may not be good, 
but others are worse and are not being terminated.” The new lan-
guage will give a great deal of strength to that defense. 
 Despite these additions, dealers may still be terminated for rea-
sons not related to the performance of their franchise obligations. 
House Bill 1239 would have gone much farther in protecting dealers 
from termination. It clearly expressed the concern prevalent among 
dealers in the wake of news that suggests that several large manu-
facturers would prefer to reduce their dealer bodies, especially by 
removing smaller dealers and dealers which are not top performers. 
The proposed language is quite lengthy.128 These are salient features: 
that the manufacturer be required to prove by clear and convincing 
evidence all of the following: (i) the termination is permitted by the 
                                                                                                                    
 125. 353 So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). 
 126. Broward Truck & Equip. Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., Fla. Admin. Rec. Or-
der No. 93-5966 (Final Order Aug. 18, 1994); see also Import City, Inc. v. Daihatsu Am., 
Inc., No. 92-30199/LAC (N.D. Fla. June 23, 1993) (order granting summary judgment), 
aff’d, 21 F.3d 1125 (11th Cir. 1994) (without opinion) (decision to abandon United States 
market sufficient good cause for cancellation). 
 127. See, e.g., Bill Gallman Pontiac, GMC Truck, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., Fla. Admin. 
Order No. 89-0505 (Feb. 28, 1991) (on file with Clerk, Dep’t of High. Saf. & Motor Veh.). 
 128. Fla. HB 1239, § 5 (2001) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.641). 
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franchise agreement, and the provision is not suspect under public 
policy considerations, including adhesion due to the relative bargain-
ing positions of the parties; (ii) good faith; (iii) good cause; and (iv) 
material and substantial breach. Good cause may not be solely based 
on breach, including a desire for greater sales performance, but must 
be shown by clear and convincing evidence to have caused significant 
damage to the manufacturer.129 Additionally, performance-based 
termination must offer an opportunity for cure,130 and termination for 
fraud must prove that those in charge of the dealership knew of the 
fraud and failed to take steps to remedy it.131 
 Practitioners will recognize that each of these proposed provisions 
derives from experience with dealer termination cases. One may be 
tempted to observe that to have passed the package in House Bill 
1239 would have given dealers virtual immunity from termination, 
save for serious malfeasance or complete nonfeasance. This would be 
an overly harsh reaction. Regulation of dealer termination recognizes 
that, having expended great sums of money to represent a manufac-
turer, the dealer must be protected from the manufacturer’s desire to 
change its method of selling at the dealer’s expense. It is under-
standable that dealers who hear of other dealers being terminated 
because rogue employees have defrauded the manufacturer or the 
public without management’s knowledge, or for perceived perform-
ance deficiencies which are hardly the worst in the area, believe that 
strong protection is in order. 
 While the more specific proposals of House Bill 1239 were not 
adopted, the fact that manufacturers now must bear the burden of 
proof and must demonstrate that they are not engaging in selective 
enforcement is a genuine step for dealers in the regulation of dealer 
terminations. It remains to be seen whether these changes will pro-
vide significantly greater protection to dealers than the 2000 Act 
when cases are actually litigated. 
 b.   Modification.—The procedures established with respect to a 
proposed termination are also applicable if a manufacturer proposes 
to modify or replace a franchise in such a way as to “adversely alter 
the rights or obligations of a motor vehicle dealer under an existing 
franchise agreement or will substantially impair the sales, service 
obligations, or investment” of the dealer.132 Clearly, such a provision 
is as important as the termination provision to those dealers whose 
franchise agreements are not perpetual or have clauses that contem-
plate modification. Whereas termination may be an event affecting 
                                                                                                                    
 129. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.641(d)). 
 130. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.641(e)). 
 131. Id. (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.641(f)). 
 132. FLA. STAT. § 320.641(1)(a) (2001). 
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only the occasional dealer, periodic refranchising affects the vast ma-
jority of dealers. 
 The pre-2001 statute came under scrutiny in Chrysler Corp. v. 
Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles.133 In that 
case, the manufacturer had given notice of its intention to modify its 
franchise agreement to make explicit that United States dealers 
were prohibited from exporting vehicles manufactured for domestic 
sale.134 Several dealers filed a complaint with the Department. 
Chrysler defended by claiming that the statute was unconstitutional 
and filed in circuit court.135 The case was decided based on where 
constitutional challenges in an administrative context are appropri-
ately adjudicated. The case blazes no new territory. What is of inter-
est here is Chrysler’s facial challenge; namely, that the absence of 
standards for determining if a modification is unfair or prohibited 
rendered this portion of the statute unconstitutional as an improper 
delegation of legislative authority.136 The case was not further re-
solved in litigation, but the prospect of the constitutional challenge 
has clearly led to the addition in 2001 of the language: “A modifica-
tion or replacement is unfair if it is not clearly permitted by the fran-
chise agreement; is not undertaken in good faith; or is not under-
taken for good cause.”137 Certainly, this is not a particularly detailed 
direction, but the terms “good faith” and “good cause” are sufficiently 
established so that the modification section should be safe from an 
improper delegation argument. 
 What remains to be seen, however, is how this new language will 
be applied. The “trigger point” for the provision remains somewhat 
problematic. The statute does not say that franchise agreements may 
not be modified or replaced. Rather, a proposed modification or re-
placement must be noticed if the alteration will adversely affect 
dealers.138 The manufacturer is in something of a box. Section 
320.641 allows dealers to void any adverse change that is made in 
the agreement without following the procedures of the statute. Con-
sequently, the manufacturer is obliged to notice any change for fear 
that it may later be determined to have been adverse. Conversely, 
however, is giving notice, even with a reservation of rights, itself tan-
tamount to an admission that the proposed change is adverse? Pre-
sumably nonadverse changes would be exempt. 
 Prior to the 2001 amendment, it was unclear whether any adverse 
change could be made. That is, was a determination that a proposed 
                                                                                                                    
 133. 720 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1st DCA 1998). 
 134. Id. at 565. 
 135. Id. at 566. 
 136. Id. at 567. 
 137. FLA. STAT. § 320.641(3). 
 138. Id. § 320.641(1)(a).  
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change was adverse sufficient in itself to determine that it was un-
fair? The amendment clearly implies that an adverse modification or 
replacement otherwise permitted by the franchise agreement may 
nonetheless be allowed if it is in good faith and undertaken for good 
cause. The problem with this standard is that it may be interpreted 
only from the manufacturer’s perspective and not with regard to the 
potential effect on the dealer—if a manufacturer articulates a com-
mercially reasonable basis to make the proposed change, then it may 
pass the “good cause” standard. The “good faith” standard can be sat-
isfied, presumably, by showing the absence of bad motive, and it is 
unlikely that the manufacturer would be “out to get” all its dealers 
by replacing the franchise agreement. If this is the result, then the 
2001 amendments, while shoring up the modification section against 
constitutional attack, may have completely pulled its teeth. 
 House Bill 1239 would have addressed this problem, principally 
with the following: 
A modification or replacement provision of a franchise agreement 
is unfair if it is not clearly permitted by the franchise agreement, 
is not undertaken in good faith, is not undertaken for good cause, 
fails to take into account the investment of a motor vehicle dealer 
in the franchise and will unreasonably adversely affect the return 
of such investment, is inconsistent with or in violation of any pro-
vision of ss. 320.60-.70, fails to provide that, in any dispute be-
tween a licensee and a motor vehicle dealer in any forum, the law 
of this state applies, both substantively and procedurally, or is un-
dertaken without regard to the equities of the motor vehicle 
dealer. For purposes of modification or replacement, good faith in-
cludes, but is not limited to, proof that the licensee is not taking 
unwarranted or disproportionate advantage of any of its motor ve-
hicle dealers given the lack of relative bargaining power of the par-
ties. For purposes of modification or replacement, good cause in-
cludes, but is not limited to, proof of a material and substantial 
change in circumstances since the execution of the franchise 
agreement which warrants the modification or replacement and 
does not cause significant detriment to any of the licensee’s motor 
vehicle dealers.139 
The specific language in House Bill 1239 can be summarized as pro-
viding that any proposed change must be evaluated with a balancing 
test between the needs of the manufacturer and the potential detri-
ment to existing dealers. From the fact that modifications are regu-
lated by the Act, it can be presumed that the intent is to provide 
dealers protection from the effects of an adverse change in their fran-
chise agreements produced by the superior bargaining power of 
manufacturers. If it turns out that the amendment provides protec-
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tion only against actual malice in proposing the change or arbitrari-
ness, the purpose of the statute will surely be thwarted. 
2.   Preserving Value: Changes in Termination Relief 
 It is a peculiarity of the motor vehicle franchise, and of state law, 
that the selling of a franchise is not freely allowed. Franchise agree-
ments uniformly recite that the franchise is not transferable, though 
most provide for some form of ownership change upon application to 
the manufacturer. Most states, however, including Florida,140 provide 
a procedure allowing a dealer to sell its franchise, with an opportu-
nity for the manufacturer to veto the proposed sale if the buyer does 
not meet certain qualifications. The greatest value of the dealership 
is, of course, the right to sell new vehicles and to receive reimburse-
ment for doing warranty service work. The franchise is the document 
which gives that right. In the past, when a dealer received a notice of 
intent to terminate, manufacturers sometimes argued that any 
transfer of the franchise agreement transfered the agreement subject 
to the termination. That general principal has not prevailed in Flor-
ida.141 The question becomes more difficult if a determination adverse 
to the dealer has been entered by the Department and the termina-
tion stayed on appeal. The pre-2001 statute provided only that the 
manufacturer could not replace the terminated dealer pending ap-
peal if a stay had been entered by the Department or an appellate 
court except by transfer of the franchise.142 
 The 2001 Act greatly amplifies protection for the terminated 
dealer’s investment. The new subsection 8 provides that any time 
during the course of a termination case, including on appeal, there 
will be a stay without bond if a transfer is proposed pursuant to sec-
tion 320.643.143 During the period of manufacturer review as pro-
vided in that statute and during the period of any administrative 
proceeding prompted by a manufacturer’s refusal to accept a pro-
posed transfer, the franchise will remain in effect.144 The dealer may 
propose two such transfers, and when any transfer is accomplished, 
the termination proceedings will be dismissed as moot.145 
 Whereas dealers did not get what they wished on the procedural 
side, these new provisions will go far to protect a dealer who believes 
that the manufacturer’s grounds for termination will not be upheld 
from losing everything if it takes its case through hearing and loses. 
                                                                                                                    
 140. See FLA. STAT. § 320.643 (2001). 
 141. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am. v. Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc., 561 So. 2d 620, 624 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1990). 
 142. FLA. STAT. § 360.641(7) (2000) (amended 2001). 
 143. Id. § 320.641(3) (2001).  
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In practical terms, as long as the dealership is economically viable 
enough to attract a buyer, the procedures will afford the dealer the 
opportunity to stay in business or to sell the dealership for many 
months after an adverse determination. 
E.   Section 320.643 and the Transfer of Franchises 
 Section 320.643 regulates transfers of franchises and ownership 
interests in dealerships. The reasons for this regulation have been 
discussed already. Neither a transfer of the franchise—usually ac-
complished by an asset sale in which one of the transferred assets is 
the franchise agreement146—nor the sale of a personally owned equity 
interest can be made without notification to the manufacturer and an 
opportunity for the manufacturer to object. On the other hand, the 
reasonableness of a manufacturer’s objection may be tested. The 
2001 amendments and the proposed amendments are direct reac-
tions to issues that have arisen in litigation over manufacturer “turn 
downs” of proposed transfers. 
1.   Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co.147 
 Section 320.643 contemplates two distinct types of transfer, trans-
fer of the franchise agreement (subsection 1) and transfer of an eq-
uity interest (subsection 2(a)). The essence of the statute includes no-
tice to the manufacturer of an intended transfer, the manufacturer’s 
vetting of the proposed transferee within a specified amount of time, 
approval, silence equaling approval, or disapproval and an opportu-
nity to test whether the disapproval is reasonable. The content of the 
required notice differs in the two types of transfer, however, as does 
the basis on which a manufacturer may “turn down” the proposed 
transfer. 
 Prior to the 2001 amendments, when a manufacturer wished to 
“turn down” a proposed transfer, the manufacturer was required to 
file an administrative complaint.148 The practical effect of such a fil-
ing when the proposed transfer was of the franchise agreement was 
that the proposed sale was eventually voided by the parties. Because 
the administrative hearing could be expected to last several months 
and an appeal would go on even longer, the buyer and seller, relying 
on contingencies contained in all purchase contracts that require 
manufacturer approval and set an outer limit for the transaction to 
                                                                                                                    
 146. In reality, manufacturers, dealers, and the Department engage in something of a 
fiction. Section 320.643 forbids a manufacturer from unreasonably refusing the transfer of 
a franchise, but manufacturers typically take the position that the franchise is not trans-
ferable. In practice, the transferee receives a new franchise in its own name. 
 147. 748 So. 2d 993 (Fla. 1999). 
 148. FLA. STAT. § 320.643(1) (2000) (amended 2001).  
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close, voided the contract. If the transaction is at arm’s length, no one 
wants to risk the adverse consequences to business operations of 
keeping the transaction in limbo. Additionally, because the only re-
lief the Department can provide is a determination as to whether the 
transfer can take place,149 the offended party, usually the disap-
pointed buyer, will bring a suit for damages pursuant to section 
320.697, Florida Statutes.150 
 Hawkins was just such a damage action. Its resolution led to the 
Florida Supreme Court’s guidance on how section 320.643 is to be in-
terpreted. The effort to account for the effects of that case brought 
manufacturers and dealers into disagreement in the 2001 legislature. 
 The buyers in Hawkins were purchasing all the shares of the 
dealership company.151 Thus, they contended that the manufacturer 
was only allowed to look at the moral character of the proposed 
transferees.152 The purchasers proposed, however, to buy all the stock 
of the dealer corporation and to change the executive management.153 
The manufacturer turned down the proposal based not on the moral 
character of the proposed transferees but on their business experi-
ence, which is a criterion applicable to section 320.643(1)—when the 
proposed transfer is of the franchise.154 The trial court—the United 
States Court for the Middle District of Florida—held that in this in-
stance, where there was a proposed change of control and of execu-
tive management, the manufacturer could look to the business ex-
perience of the proposed transferee, and granted summary judgment 
to the manufacturer.155 The case came to the Florida Supreme Court 
on certified question from the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Eleventh Circuit.156 
 The supreme court engaged in extensive statutory analysis to 
reach an interesting conclusion. On the one hand, the court noted: 
                                                                                                                    
 149. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Ernie Haire Ford, Inc., Fla. Admin. Order No. 98-5473 
(Apr. 5, 1999) (order dismissing action without hearing) (on file with Clerk, Dep’t High. 
Saf. & Motor Veh.), aff’d, 758 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1st DCA 2000) (without opinion). But see 
Chrysler Corp. v. Plaza Dodge, Inc., Fla. Admin. Order No. 94-3869 (Sept. 3, 1996) (on file 
with Clerk, Dep’t High. Saf. & Motor Veh.) (finding son wishing to purchase shares from 
father to be of good moral character). 
 150. See Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 32 F.3d 528, 
529 (11th Cir. 1994). 
 151. Hawkins, 748 So. 2d at 995.  
 152. Id. at 996. The court noted that while the statutory scheme controlled the present 
case, the scheme had not changed and the decision applied equally to the 1993 statute. Id. 
at 994 n.1. The 1993 statute was the same version in effect in 2000. FLA. STAT. § 
320.643(2)(a) (2000) (amended 2001).  
 153. Hawkins, 748 So. 2d at 995 (holding change of executive management requires no-
tice and approval); see also FLA. STAT. § 320.644 (1993). 
 154. Hawkins, 748 So. 2d at 995.  
 155. Id. at 996. 
 156. Id. at 994. 
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Although we agree with Ford and the amici for Ford that as a mat-
ter of public policy, manufacturers have a substantial and legiti-
mate interest in designating those with whom the public will 
transact business, this Court may not rewrite statutes contrary to 
their plain language. The policy concerns raised by Ford and the 
amici for Ford more appropriately must be addressed by the Legis-
lature. While one may agree or disagree with the underlying policy 
concerns or wisdom of legislation with regard to the relationship of 
a franchise agreement to corporation and stock ownership, the in-
escapable legal conclusion is that section 320.643(2)(a) may, under 
some other circumstances not present here, provide the exclusive 
basis for objection when the totality of the transaction is solely and 
exclusively an equity interest transfer.157 
On the other hand, the court found: 
Contrary to the position taken by . . . [Appellants], the proposed 
transaction here cannot be viewed in a vacuum. Instead, the total-
ity of the transaction must be considered, not only the designation 
or name attributed to the documents. If the transaction here in-
volved only a sterile transfer of an equity interest in a corporation, 
without more, only the criteria for objection set forth in section 
320.643(2)(a) would be applicable. However, because the proposed 
transaction here involved not only the transfer of all the equity in-
terest in [the dealership], but also a change in the executive man-
agement control of that corporate motor vehicle dealership, section 
320.643(2)(a) does not provide the exclusive basis for objection. The 
terms and conditions of the proposed transaction here were not 
separate and distinct, but were instead part of a unified whole. 
Therefore, in the present case, [the manufacturer] could properly 
object to the proposed transaction based on the criteria set forth in 
both section 320.643(2)(a) and section 320.644.158 
Thus, the manufacturer was not allowed to consider the criteria in 
section 320.643(1) but could consider the criteria with respect to pro-
spective executive managers in section 320.644. Because business 
experience was an applicable criterion in section 320.644, the result 
was the same as if section 320.643(1) had been applicable. 
 The result, as well as the supreme court’s analysis, provide a clear 
invitation to legislate. In this, the manufacturer’s lobby seems to 
have prevailed. The only change affecting criteria (changes in proce-
dure will be discussed below) is the addition of the transferee’s finan-
cial qualifications as an item to be examined with moral character 
and business experience when a  transfer is proposed.159 Indeed, this 
is a small change given the notice requirement of section 320.643(1). 
The amendment only makes explicit what has probably been im-
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plicit.160 The dealers cannot be accused of not trying. House Bill 1239 
sought several changes in the statute to overrule case law. 
 The bill would have overruled Hawkins with the following: 
When a change of executive management is proposed in conjunc-
tion with a proposed transfer under this section, a licensee may re-
ject the proposed change in executive management consistent with 
s. 320.644. The licensee may not turn down a proposed transfer 
under either s. 320.643 (1) or s. 320.643 (2) because a proposed 
change of executive management under s. 320.644 is made in con-
junction with the proposed transfer.161 
This is, of course, the appellants’ argument in Hawkins: franchise 
changes and management changes must be considered separately.162 
The practical result—from the dealer’s point of view—is that a quali-
fied transferee must be accepted even if the transferee as owner must 
find another manager acceptable to the manufacturer. Indeed, this is 
a significant point in the present fluid market for motor vehicle deal-
erships. An owner of an existing dealer may find a well-financed 
buyer with no experience in the business wishing to buy the stock of 
the dealership corporation and propose a person with experience as 
the manager. Because the manufacturer does not approve the man-
ager, the dealers contend, the owner should not be prevented from 
selling the shares. The buyer simply must provide another, accept-
able manager. For whatever reason, Hawkins was not overruled. 
 That dealers wish to broaden the opportunity to sell their dealer-
ships is obvious from a second proposed amendment. In a proposed 
franchise transfer, the proposed transferee must “agree[] in writing 
to comply with all requirements of the franchise then in effect.”163 It 
has been squarely held that if the proposed transferee buys the fran-
chise on condition that the dealership be relocated, the transferee 
cannot satisfy this requirement, and the proposed transfer is not 
governed by section 320.643.164 This is a thorn in the side of sellers, 
because it is often the case that the buyer wishes to move the fran-
chise from the seller’s facility to an established facility owned by the 
buyer. In such a case, however, the protections of section 320.643 are 
simply unavailable to protect the transaction from unreasonable 
“turn down.” Consequently, sellers and buyers are completely at the 
manufacturer’s mercy in such proposed transfers. 
                                                                                                                    
 160. See Mercedez-Benz of N. Am. v. Mike Smith Pontiac GMC, Inc., 561 So. 2d 620, 
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 This is not true in all states.165 House Bill 1239 would have placed 
Florida among the states granting some protection to “relocation” 
transfers: 
When a transfer is proposed which is contingent upon a proposed 
relocation, the licensee may turn down the proposed transfer only 
if the proposed relocation would be subject to protest under s. 
320.642 or if the proposed facilities do not satisfy the licensee’s 
reasonable, written, and uniformly applied facilities guidelines.166 
Again, the issue is how much control the manufacturer may exert. 
Clearly, the dealer lobby was unable to overrule Gus Machado, and 
this section was abandoned in the give and take of the legislative 
process. 
 It would, however, make good policy. The manufacturer could not 
prevent a dealer from realizing the fruits of his or her labors by sell-
ing to a willing and qualified buyer merely because the manufacturer 
wished to exercise complete control over the location of the dealer-
ship. Likewise, the manufacturer could not thwart the dealer realiz-
ing the goodwill value built up in the dealership because the manu-
facturer did not wish the buyer to associate the manufacturer’s prod-
uct with some other line-make, even if the facilities were otherwise 
equal to the manufacturer’s standards. 
2.   Risley v. Nissan Motor Corp. USA167 
 The Risley decision—even before it was rendered—led to a proce-
dural change in section 320.643. The case involved a damage action 
under section 320.697 brought by sellers who claimed that the manu-
facturer had improperly opposed their proposed transfer and had 
thereby damaged them.168 The proposed transfer was a stock sale, 
without change of executive management, so that Hawkins man-
dated that the moral character of the proposed transfer was the only 
criterion upon which the manufacturer could rely in turning down 
the proposal.169 At issue was whether the manufacturer’s filing of its 
administrative complaint, in which it alleged that the proposed 
transferee was of bad moral character—a complaint later dismissed 
by the manufacturer—insulated the manufacturer from liability for 
violation of the statute.170 
                                                                                                                    
 165. In Ohio, for example, as long as the potential relocation facility meets the manu-
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 Under section 320.643, as it existed in 1997, the manufacturer 
was required to file an administrative action to oppose a proposed 
transfer. The manufacturer argued that it could not be held liable for 
damages caused by the filing of its complaint under the Noerr-
Pennington Doctrine; namely, that a person cannot be liable in dam-
ages for the result caused by petitioning the government.171 This led 
to the 2001 change, in which the manufacturer must now communi-
cate its disapproval to the dealer or equity owner proposing transfer 
before the dealer may file a complaint testing whether the refusal 
was “in violation of the law.”172 Committee Substitute for Senate Bill 
1256 became law with the Governor’s signature on June 8, 2001; Ris-
ley was decided on June 27, 2001. The dealers were in for a surprise. 
 It had been well established in case law that a manufacturer who 
fails to file a complaint alleging proper statutory criteria for a “turn 
down” violates section 320.643.173 The owners in Risley had argued 
that the proposed transferee was not of bad moral character—even 
though the administrative law judge had ruled that the manufac-
turer’s complaint was legally sufficient in its pleading—and so they 
were entitled to damages because the opposition was not in fact rea-
sonable.174 The court held, however: 
We disagree with Appellants’ construction of Mike Smith and § 
320.697. Mike Smith did not say that, for a licensee to be free from 
fear of reprisal under § 320.697, it had to file a successful or meri-
torious objection under § 320.643. In using the words “not permit-
ted” and “[not] properly asserted,” Mike Smith was referring to 
complaints that were legally insufficient under the Act—that is, 
complaints warranting dismissals because they lacked “a proper 
basis for a transfer challenge.” Mercedes-Benz, 561 So. 2d at 624. 
Thus, a licensee does not violate the Act pursuant to § 320.697 
when it files a legally sufficient verified complaint, irrespective of 
whether the licensee would ultimately prevail in the challenge to 
the proposed transfer.175 
The result of this decision is devastating to section 320.643. A 
320.643 administrative determination rarely goes to completion. 
Buyers and sellers simply will not wait for the outcome, and buyers 
                                                                                                                    
 171. The Doctrine is named from two cases, United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 
U.S. 657 (1965), and E.R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 
127 (1961). See Risley, 254 F.3d at 1301 n.11 (“Since we conclude Appellee did not violate § 
320.697, we need not address the argument, advanced by Appellee, that holding it liable 
under § 320.697 would violated its ‘right . . . to petition the Government for a redress of 
grievances.’ U.S. Const. amend. I.”). 
 172. Compare FLA. STAT. § 320.643 (2000), with FLA. STAT. § 320.643 (2001). 
 173. See Mike Smith Pontiac, GMC, Inc. v. Mercedes-Benz of N. Am., Inc., 32 F.3d 528, 
533 (11th Cir. 1994); Bayview Buick-GMC Truck v. Gen. Motors Corp., 597 So. 2d 887, 889 
(Fla. 1st DCA 1992). 
 174. Risley, 254 F.3d at 1300. 
 175. Id. at 1301 (footnote omitted). 
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especially do not want a determination from an administrative forum 
that they are unqualified. If that determination is to be made, they 
want the “upside” possibility of substantial damages for being unrea-
sonably thwarted in their attempts to purchase the dealership. In 
practical terms, a seller has less of a claim to damages than the 
buyer. The seller still has the dealership, and unless it wishes to 
claim that the selling price was so high that it lost a chance to sell at 
an above-market premium, it can show little damage. The sellers in 
Risley are an exception because they had agreed to accept as consid-
eration for their shares in company stock which lost value from the 
time when the sale should have occurred to the delayed closing.176 
 Consequently, a manufacturer apparently may, under Risley, 
block most transfers it disapproves for reasons unrelated to the 
qualifications or character of the proposed transferee, simply by 
turning down the transfer in its notice to the dealer on grounds cog-
nizable under the statute. A manufacturer will not need to worry 
about the merits of the case. Usually the case will become moot; at 
the worst, the Department may ultimately rule that the transfer 
must be allowed. Companies the size of General Motors will not 
make their decisions based on the cost necessary to pursue an admin-
istrative action. Thus, the protection intended by the Act for dealers 
against more powerful manufacturers is effectively thwarted, not in 
theory but in practical effect. 
 A crack of light, however, may shine through this fissure. The 
Eleventh Circuit granted rehearing sua sponte to address the affect 
of the 2001 amendments on its Risley decision: 
We sua sponte grant rehearing. Our prior opinion in this case con-
strued Fla. Stat. § 320.643. See Risley v. Nissan Motor Corp. USA, 
254 F.3d 1296 (11th Cir.2001). On June 8, 2001, the Governor of 
Florida signed Fla. Laws ch. 2001-196, which amends inter alia, 
Fla. Stat. § 320.643. These amendments pertain, in part, to the 
procedural steps for filing a complaint with the Department of 
Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles. See Fla. Laws ch. 2001-196, § 
23. Regardless, the amendments do not alter our holding or rea-
soning in this case, because, as noted in our prior opinion, the 
events here are governed by the 1997 version of the Florida Stat-
utes. See Risley, 254 F.3d at 1297 n. 1; see also Barry Cook Ford, 
Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 616 So.2d 512, 517 n. 5 (Fla. 1st DCA 1993). 
Therefore, our prior opinion is REINSTATED.177 
This is a curious statement from the Eleventh Circuit. After exami-
nation of the procedural changes in section 320.643, the statute 
seems to contain no substantive change. Now a manufacturer must 
                                                                                                                    
 176. Id. at 1298. 
 177. Risley v. Nissan Motor Corp. USA, 260 F.3d 1310, 1310  (11th Cir. 2001).  
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notify the dealer or owner giving “the material reasons” for its rejec-
tion.178 The dealer or owner179 must then file a complaint. Apparently, 
however, the Eleventh Circuit is not sure what the amendment may 
mean. The 1997 version of the statute required the manufacturer to 
file a verified complaint “for a determination that the proposed trans-
feree is not a person qualified to be a transferee under this sec-
tion.”180 The 2001 Act allows a dealer (or owner) to file a complaint 
with the Department “alleging that the rejection was in violation of 
the law or the franchise agreement.”181 Indeed, this difference in lan-
guage may in fact be substantive. A new section 320.64 violation was 
also created in 2001: 
Notwithstanding the terms of any franchise agreement, the appli-
cant or licensee has rejected or withheld approval of any proposed 
transfer in violation of s. 320.643 or a proposed change of executive 
management in violation of s. 320.644.182 
Manufacturers who violate this section are made expressly liable for 
claims under section 320.697, a provision added in 2001.183 While sec-
tion 320.697 has already been available to persons injured by viola-
tion of any section of the Act, this reinforcement in section 
320.64(32), specifically with respect to transfers and changes of man-
agement, and the modification of the language in section 320.643, 
may well be a basis to argue that the Eleventh Circuit was indeed 
perceptive and felt that application of the 2001 Act would require a 
different result in Risley. If so, the inquiry in a damage suit will be 
whether the “turn down” was unreasonable and ipso facto a violation 
of the statute. The Eleventh Circuit may very well have understood 
that its Risley ruling, while in accord with the literal language of the 
statute, produced a harsh result in the practical world and offered a 
chance to revisit the question in a case controlled by the 2001 Act. 
F.   The First Shall Be Last: Changes and Nonchanges 
to Section 320.642 
 No section of the Act is more litigated than section 320.642. This 
statute requires that a manufacturer who wishes to place an addi-
tional dealership in a “community or territory” or to relocate an exist-
ing dealer (with some exceptions), must notify the Department, 
                                                                                                                    
 178. FLA. STAT. § 320.643(1) (2001).  
 179. There is an unfortunate turn of phrase in section 320.643(2)(a). The “person 
whose proposed sale of stock is rejected” may file a complaint with the Department; the 
manufacturer must answer what is referred to as the “motor vehicle dealer’s complaint.” 
The correction is obvious. Id. § 320.643(2)(a). 
 180. Id. § 320.643(1), (2)(a) (1997) (amended 2001). 
 181. Id. § 320.643(1), (2)(a) (2001). 
 182. Id. § 320.64(32). 
 183. Id. § 320.64 (prefatory language). 
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which in turn publishes this intention and notifies affected dealers.184 
Dealers with standing, as defined in the statute, may file protests 
with the Department requiring the manufacturer to prove that it is 
not being adequately represented by existing dealers in the “commu-
nity or territory.”185 Such statutes are found, in some form, in most  
states. Thus, one of the cornerstones of manufacturer-dealer regula-
tion is the requirement that manufacturers may not franchise addi-
tional dealers or relocate dealers in the market at will. 
 Practitioners know that the evidence in cases under this section is 
often dominated by complicated analyses of data by experts. The 
process of preparing a case is not a short one as acknowledged in sec-
tion 320.699(2). The path that led to the modification of this section 
is an example of the unexpected consequences of the budget bill. 
 In 1999 (and 2000), section 320.699(2) provided that in protests 
under section 320.642, “a hearing shall be held within 180 days of 
the date of filing of the first objection or notice of protest, unless the 
time is extended by the hearing officer for good cause shown.” Litiga-
tion under statutes such as section 320.642 delays the operation of 
new dealerships; therefore, manufacturers are quite sensitive to de-
lay. Nonetheless, both dealers and manufacturers need time to pre-
pare their cases, and practitioners expect that reasonable requests 
for hearing dates and extensions, especially joint requests, be rou-
tinely granted by the administrative law judges who conduct the sec-
tion 120.57 hearings required by Florida’s Administrative Procedure 
Act. In 2000, however, the legislature’s budget implementation bill 
set performance standards for administrative law judges that related 
directly to the speed with which they disposed of their cases. Sud-
denly, final hearings were being set on short notice and requests for 
extension—even joint requests—were being denied. 
 In an industry-specific joint effort by manufacturers, section 
320.699(2) was amended as follows: 
If a written objection or notice of protest is filed with the depart-
ment under paragraph (1)(b), a hearing shall be held not sooner 
than 180 days nor later than 240 days from the date of filing of the 
first objection or notice of protest, unless the time is extended by 
the administrative law judge for good cause shown. This subsec-
tion shall govern the schedule of hearings in lieu of any other pro-
vision of law with respect to administrative hearings conducted by 
the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles or the Di-
vision of Administrative Hearings, including performance stan-
                                                                                                                    
 184. Id. § 320.642(1).  
 185. See id. § 320.642(2)(a)(2).  
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dards of state agencies, which may be included in current and fu-
ture appropriations acts.186 
It is hard for an amendment to address more specifically a peculiar 
complaint of a specific industry. 
 What did not happen, however, was a change to section 320.642 
itself. With the statute in existence since 1970, there have been very 
few cases in which a manufacturer was not able to convince the De-
partment that a “community or territory” was not being adequately 
represented. There has been only one such case in the past twenty 
years.187 That is not to say that the statute has provided no help to 
existing dealers. Practitioners know that many cases between pro-
testing dealers and manufacturers seeking to add a new dealer or to 
relocate an existing dealer have been settled precisely because of the 
existence of the statute. Previous modification of the statute in 1988 
has made no difference. Practitioners pressed two changes on the 
2001 legislature. One related the practical conduct of section 320.642 
hearings, and the other addressed a specific case. 
 Practitioners are aware that the bulk of evidence in these cases is 
presented by opposing experts who compare the performance of the 
line-make in the area under consideration with possible performance 
in another area. Courts have repeatedly held that, in fact, a larger 
area may be generally well represented, but if there is inadequacy in 
a smaller area, an “identifiable plot,” manufacturers may show in-
adequacy in that area alone.188 Moreover, dealers have come to be-
lieve that evidence is routinely accepted comparing performance in 
an area to that in another gerrymander area used solely to support 
the manufacturer’s proposition that existing dealers are not “doing 
the job” in their area. In response, House Bill 1239 would have in-
cluded the following language in section 320.642(2)(b)3: 
Furthermore, with respect to evaluating the performance of the 
line-make within the community or territory, a geographic area 
used for making comparisons must be reasonably similar in demo-
graphic traits to the community or territory, including age, income, 
import penetration, education, size class preference, and product 
popularity, and such comparison areas may not be smaller than an 
entire county. Reasonably expected market penetration must be 
measured with respect to the community or territory as a whole 
and not with respect to any part thereof or identifiable plot 
therein.189 
                                                                                                                    
 186. Id. § 320.699(2).  
 187. See Mitsubishi Motor Sales of Am., Inc. v. King Motor Co. of Coconut Creek Ltd., 
Fla. Admin. Order No. 99-3978 (Dec. 12, 2000) (on file with Clerk, Dep’t of High. Saf. & 
Motor Veh.). 
 188. See Bill Kelley Chevrolet, Inc. v. Calvin, 322 So. 2d 50, 52 (Fla. 1st DCA 1975). 
 189. Fla. HB 1239, § 6 (2001) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.642 (2)(b)(3)).  
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Obviously, only those who litigate these cases would have understood 
the import of this section. 
 Another proposed change would have addressed an unexpected 
result in a specific case. In Meteor Motors, Inc. v. Hyundai Motor 
America Corp.,190 the industry discovered that in the court’s opinion, 
the Act did not provide what many practitioners had assumed it did. 
In 1993, the legislature added “servicing” to “selling” in the definition 
of “motor vehicle dealer,” making anyone who services vehicles under 
an agreement with a manufacturer a dealer for the purposes of the 
Act.191 The plaintiff in Meteor Motors contended that when the manu-
facturer entered into an agreement with a rental company to receive 
warranty reimbursements for warranty work done on its rental vehi-
cles, the manufacturer should have followed the procedures of section 
320.642.192  
 While the court found that the rental car company was included in 
an exception to the definition, it also concluded that section 320.642 
would not have applied even if there had been no exception, as 
existing dealers only had standing to protest in the case of proposed 
additional dealers for the sale of vehicles—there was no mention of 
service in the standing section.193 In response, House Bill 1239 con-
tained a two-word modification to section 320.642(3), from “to be sold 
by the proposed additional or relocated dealer” to “to be sold or ser-
viced by the proposed additional or relocated dealer.”194 The legisla-
ture did not adopt this effort to overrule Meteor Motors. 
IV.   CONCLUSION 
 The 2001 legislature made a number of changes to the Act that 
address dealer concerns in the current economic environment. These 
involve most directly the changes to section 320.64 that regulate the 
direct relationship between manufacturer and dealer in the day-to-
day conduct of business. The 2001 Act also addresses fears that deal-
ers have about manufacturer competition in the marketplace. What 
the legislature insufficiently addressed were dealer attempts to push 
back manufacturer gains in case law interpreting the Act. The legis-
lature provided the dealers new protections to preserve the value of 
their franchises in the face of termination proceedings but did not af-
ford the broader protections against termination itself which the 
dealers had wanted. 
                                                                                                                    
 190. No. 97-8820-Civ., 1999 WL 1800074 (S.D. Fla. 1999). 
 191. Compare FLA. STAT. § 320.60(11) (Supp. 1992), with FLA. STAT. § 320.60(11) 
(1993). 
 192. Meteor Motors, 1999 WL 1800074, at *2. 
 193. Id. at *3-4. 
 194. Fla. HB 1239, § 6 (2001) (proposed FLA. STAT. § 320.642(3)). 
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 The industry that the Act regulated is unusual. While it is of great 
importance to Florida consumers, the Act’s regulations go largely un-
observed except by the factions within the industry itself. For this 
reason the jockeying for position in the 2001 legislature is an espe-
cially good illustration of the legislative process. The issues involved 
were not affected by public opinion campaigns. They were, however, 
advocated by well-paid professional lobbyists on each side. The re-
sulting legislation unusually reveals the unobtrusive tussling be-
tween well financed factions taking place “off the radar,” and 
provides an interesting study of the legislative process at work. 
